

---

# Continental Assessment on the Application of the Joint Sector Review (JSR) Process

---



**AUDA-NEPAD**  
AFRICAN UNION DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

**CAADP**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The AUDA-NEPAD is grateful to the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) for their financial support in undertaking this pertinent study to inform the JSR practice across the continent. The Agency also acknowledges the efforts of the Director of Agriculture of ECOWAS Commission in Abuja (Nigeria), the Director of Hub Rural based in Dakar (Senegal), the ReSAKS Regional Coordinators of East and Central Africa, and those of West Africa in providing pertinent contacts and documentation for this assignment. Their valuable inputs are well appreciated.

The contribution of key stakeholders involved in the NAIP and RAIP implementation and the Agricultural Joint Sector Review processes in the targeted RECs and countries is highly appreciated. More specifically, we extend our appreciations to the officials and experts from the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the republic of Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda and Senegal for availing themselves during the various rounds of interviews and consultations.

The inputs of the various State and Non-State Actors of the Agricultural Sector were also critical in the development of the content of this document.

In the context of the confinement due to COVID-19 pandemics, when travels were banned and people lived in confinement, the author commends the relentless efforts and commitments of key stakeholders, national and international partners, who participated online through the Zoom Video conference, despite various difficulties such as poor internet connection amongst others.

**Dr Augustin Wambo Yamdjeu**

Head of Agriculture Unit , AUDA-NEPAD

## ACRONYMS

<b>AASR</b>	Africa Agriculture Status Report
<b>AATS</b>	Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard
<b>ADLI</b>	Agricultural Development Led Industrialization
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AGRA</b>	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
<b>ALMA</b>	African Leaders Malaria Alliance
<b>AOI</b>	Agriculture Orientation Index
<b>APRM</b>	African Peer Review Mechanism
<b>ASCU</b>	Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit
<b>ASDS</b>	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
<b>ASGTS</b>	Agricultural Sector Growth and Transformation Strategy
<b>ASTI</b>	Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators
<b>ASWG</b>	Agricultural Sector Working Group
<b>APESS</b>	Association pour la Promotion de l'élevage en Savane et au Sahel
<b>ATA</b>	Agricultural Transformation Agency (Ethiopia)
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>AUC</b>	African Union Commission
<b>BR</b>	Biennial Review
<b>BSWG</b>	Budget sector working groups
<b>CAADP</b>	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
<b>CNCAS</b>	Caisse nationale de crédit agricole du Sénégal
<b>CNCR</b>	Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>DANIDA</b>	Danish International Development Agency
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Department (UK)
<b>DSIP</b>	Development Strategy and Investment Plan
<b>EBA</b>	Enabling the Business of Agriculture (The World Bank)
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ECOWAP</b>	Economic Community of West African States Regional Agricultural Policy
<b>EDPRS</b>	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>FBO</b>	Farmer-Based Organization
<b>FEWACCI</b>	Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry
<b>GAFFSP</b>	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IFPRI</b>	International Food Policy Research Institute
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund

<b>IS&amp;R</b>	Implementation Strategy and Roadmap
<b>JSR</b>	Joint Sector Review
<b>JSRC</b>	Joint Sector Review Committee
<b>JVC</b>	Join Venture Council
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MA</b>	Mutual Accountability
<b>MAAIF</b>	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
<b>MAF</b>	Mutual Accountability Framework
<b>MAFAP</b>	Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies (FAO)
<b>MFPED</b>	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
<b>MINAGRI</b>	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (Rwanda)
<b>MINALOC</b>	Ministry of Local Government (Rwanda)
<b>MINECOFIN</b>	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Rwanda)
<b>MIRA</b>	Micro Policy and Regulatory Reforms for African Agribusiness
<b>MTEF</b>	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
<b>NAADS</b>	National Agricultural Advisory Service (Uganda)
<b>NAIP</b>	National Agricultural Investment Plan
<b>NAFSIP</b>	National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan
<b>NARO</b>	National Agricultural Research Organization (Uganda)
<b>NARS</b>	National Agricultural Research System
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for Africa's Development
<b>New Alliance</b>	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>NHA</b>	National Health Accounts
<b>NPCA</b>	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
<b>NRA</b>	Nominal Rate of Assistance
<b>NRP</b>	Nominal Rate of Protection
<b>NUC</b>	National Dialogue (Umushyikirano) Council
<b>ODA</b>	Overseas Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PC</b>	Performance Category
<b>PEAP</b>	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
<b>PEFA</b>	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
<b>PER</b>	Public Expenditure Review
<b>PFA</b>	Prosperity for All (Uganda)
<b>PforR</b>	Program-for-Results
<b>PMA</b>	Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (Uganda)
<b>PPP</b>	Public-Private Partnership
<b>PSTA</b>	Strategic Plan for Agriculture Transformation
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Community
<b>ROPPA</b>	Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

<b>ReSAKSS</b>	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SPIU</b>	Single Project Implementation Unit
<b>SRA</b>	Strategy to Revitalize Agriculture (Kenya)
<b>STC</b>	Specialized Technical Committee (AUC)
<b>SWAp</b>	Sector-Wide Approach (Kenya)
<b>SWOT</b>	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
<b>TFP</b>	Total Factor Productivity
<b>TWG</b>	Thematic Working Group (Kenya)
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1.	Background and Context	11
1.2.	Objectives	12
1.3.	Methodological approach	12
1.3.1.	Data collection	12
1.3.2.	Target RECs and countries	13
1.3.3.	Data analysis, and interpretation:	13
1.3.4.	Structure of the report	13
<b>II.</b>	<b>THE JSR PROCESSES IN ECOWAS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN WEST AFRICA</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1.	The JSR processes in ECOWAS	15
2.1.1.	ECOWAP for implementing CAADP in West Africa	15
2.1.2.	The Regional JSR processes in strengthening the implementation of NAIPs/RAIP in West Africa	15
2.1.3.	The Regional Joint Sector Review of ECOWAS	16
2.1.4.	Frequent JSR like-meetings organized by ECOWAS	17
2.1.5.	Non-State Actors are a key players in the RAIP and the JSR processes.	18
2.1.6.	Conduct the JSR Meeting in West Africa	19
2.1.7.	Funding RAIP and the JSR	20
2.1.8.	ECOWAP Scientific and Technical Institutions support M & E and Learning	20
2.1.9.	The communications plan of ECOWAP/RAIP	21
2.2.	Gaps in the ECOWAP implementation	21
2.3.	The JSR process in Senegal	22
2.3.1.	Country context:	22
2.3.2.	The JSR process as implemented in Senegal	22
2.4.	The JSR processes in Nigeria	25
2.4.1.	The agricultural development policies	25
2.4.2.	JSR process as implemented in Nigeria	25
2.4.3.	A JSR-like process set up by a dynamic private sector	26
2.4.4.	A critical lack of quality data in the agricultural sector	26
<b>III.</b>	<b>THE JSR PROCESSES IN EAC AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1.	The context of East Africa Community	27
3.2.	EAC Partner States finally sign CAADP Compact	28
3.3.	EAC CAADP Results Framework	28
3.4.	The Regional Agricultural Council is JSR-like process in EAC	28
3.5.	Finding: key challenge with CAADP implementation in EAC	29

3.6.	The JSR practices in Rwanda	30
3.6.1.	The country context	30
3.6.2.	The JSR process as implemented in Rwanda	30
3.1.1.	The JSR innovative practices in the context of COVID-19 pandemic	31
3.1.2.	Key features of the JSR processes in Rwanda that can be scaled up to other countries	32
3.2.	The JSR processes in Kenya	34
3.2.1.	The country context	34
3.2.2.	The current JSR processes as implemented in Kenya	34
3.2.3.	The effect of the JSR on the quality of the BR of Kenya	37
3.2.4.	The difficulties of Kenya for appropriate data for the BR	37
<b>IV.</b>	<b>THE CASE OF CAMEROON IN CENTRAL AFRICA (ECCAS)</b>	<b>38</b>
4.1.	The national policy	38
4.2.	The governance, monitoring and evaluation of RSDS/NAIP in Cameroon	38
4.3.	The Joint Sector Review Processes as Implemented in Cameroon	39
4.4.	JSR resolutions concerned	40
4.5.	Key issues that need further attention	40
<b>V.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES IN THE JSR IMPLEMENTATION</b>	<b>42</b>
5.1.	Missing links in the current JSR processes	42
5.1.1.	Poor consultation process of NSA	42
5.1.2.	Condescending attitude of bureaucracy is a real drawback during the JSR.	42
5.1.3.	Feeling of exclusion from the implementation of NAIP and RAIP by NSA	42
5.1.4.	Insufficient involvement of NSA throughout the JSR process	42
5.1.5.	Insufficient resourcing of JSR	43
5.1.6.	Lack of interest and commitment by the leadership of the various stakeholders	43
5.1.7.	Unclear mandate of the JSR coordination platforms	43
5.1.8.	Communication approach on NAIPs, RAIPs and the JSR	43
5.2.	Progress towards improving the JSR practices in pursuit of the accountability	44
5.2.1.	A multi-sectoral coordination-led agricultural transformation	44
5.2.2.	NSA and Gender inclusion in the implementation platforms of NAIPs and RAIPs	44
5.2.3.	Putting more emphasis on capacity building of NSA and bringing in the private sector	44
5.2.4.	Funding the Secretariat in charge of the JSR preparation	44
5.3.	The uniqueness of the JSR for mutual accountability	45
5.3.1.	Inclusiveness in the JSR process	45
5.3.2.	The JSR is part of the implementation of the CAADP processes	46
5.4.	Some procedural and substantive elements are needed for an acceptable JSR	46
5.5.	The effect of the JSR on the Biennial Report (BR) performance of selected countries	46
5.5.1.	The BR: a benchmarking method to evaluate progress against targets	46
5.5.2.	Progress made by individual countries since 2017	47
5.5.3.	Difficulties in data collection for JSR and BR can be overcome	48



<b>VI.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>49</b>
6.1.	Conclusions	49
6.2.	Necessity to review tools and instruments, coordination mechanism for JSR and BR	51
6.3.	Recommendations: the most essential steps to take the JSR experience to scale	51
6.3.1.	Recommendation to the RECS:	51
6.3.2.	Recommendations to the countries	51
6.3.3.	Recommendations to AUC-NEPAD/CAADP	52
<b>VII.</b>	<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>VIII.</b>	<b>ANNEXES</b>	<b>57</b>
	Annex 1: List of People Interviewed during the Join Sector Review Mission	57

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Population growth in selected countries in 2017	14
Table 2:	Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review in Senegal	24
Table 3:	Achievements on completing CAADP Process in Nigeria	27
Table 4:	Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review Workshops in Kenya	38
Table 5:	Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review Workshop in Cameroon	41
Table 6:	overall progress for implementing the Malabo Declaration	48

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Target RECs and countries	14
Figure 2:	Key stakeholder groups of the ECOWAP	17
Figure 3:	The RAIP institutional architecture	29

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2003, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Maputo Declaration on the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), setting broad targets of 6% annual growth in agricultural GDP and allocating at least 10% of public expenditures to the agricultural sector. Ten years later in June 2014 in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), they adopted seven Commitments in the Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation designed to achieve agricultural transformation by 2025.

One of the novel features of the Malabo Declaration (2014) is the emphasis on implementation and Mutual Accountability enshrined in the last commitment made by the Head of States. A key instrument for realizing this accountability is the Joint Sector Review (JSR), also for implementing the CAADP Results Framework.

Several countries in Africa do carry an annual evaluation of the implementation of their National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs). Although the path to policy formulation, implementation, and review is often country-specific among countries that are engaged in the CAADP, considerable changes have been observed. The inclusive, participatory, transparent, and evidence-based policy making process is becoming more widely used in the JSR assessment exercise. The outcomes of such an annual performance review are meant to provide information for prioritized interventions for the following financial year and are captured in the ministerial budget framework papers.

The objective of this study was to assess agricultural JSRs experiences within countries and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with the ultimate goal to support the efforts of scaling up the practices across the continent. The study was carried using a sample of five countries and two RECs and based on desk reviews and stakeholder consultations.

This study was based on desk reviews and stakeholder consultations in 5 countries and 2 RECs. The RECs assessed were: (i) The East African Community (EAC), and (ii) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while the countries assessed were: Rwanda and Kenya in East Africa; and Senegal and Nigeria in West Africa as per the suggestion by the contracting party. A fifth country, Cameroon, was later added in the sample based on the fact it is the most advanced country in Central Africa in the implementation of the CAADP framework and that data was relatively easy to access for the consultant who resides there.

The study used a number of approaches in collecting information from stakeholders, and these included: (i) Consultation with the Ministries and RECs Departments in charge of the agricultural and rural sector; (ii) Structured interviews with stakeholders mostly on-line, through “Zoom”, WhatsApp, telephone, or e-mail, in the context of confinement due to the covid-19 pandemic; (iii) Consultation with Development Partners (DPs), Research and Training Institutions, and Non-State Actors. The discussions were guided by pre-designed checklists.

The synthesis of findings on the Joint Sector Review processes in selected countries and RECs indicate that they are all committed to align the development, implementation and review of their agricultural and food security policies, plans and strategies with the principles and the CAADP framework. They all have set up the processes of establishing and institutionalizing a comprehensive agriculture Joint Sector Review mechanism, but at various degrees of success and achievement.

The JSR serves as a means for operationalizing the concept of mutual accountability. The agricultural JSR, which is a mechanism for operationalizing the CAADP mutual accountability framework (MAF), involves stakeholders in the sector who hold each other accountable for delivery on objectives that they jointly developed and use yardsticks on which they jointly agreed. JSRs create a platform to: (i) assess the performance and results of the agricultural sector; (ii) assist governments in setting sector policy and priorities; and (iii) assess how well the Government and NSAs have implemented pledges and commitments as laid out in NAIPs, programs, projects, and other agreements. JSRs also facilitate information sharing and consensus building among different stakeholders in a sector.

Compared to the countries situation at the beginning of the process, the JSRs are becoming more inclusive, impartial, evidence-based, and results-oriented, and the scope of work is expanding, all of which are to the benefit of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, JSR practices have improved the attitude toward accountability and governance of resources within the sector. It is like a non-written contract between participants such as the Government, FBOs, CSOs, Development partners and the private sector. However, it has not yet reach desired levels. Conducting JSRs have helped the development of M&E and the need for better data than before in most countries. Taking tangible steps to strengthen data and M&E systems is critical as stated for Senegal and Kenya.

The JSR processes have helped to build capacities of stakeholder, mostly at the Regional JSR of ECOWAS and Senegal. Through dialogues and meetings, the JSRs have provided a voice to FBOs, CSOs, and the private sector and the likelihood that their voice is heard and put to use. This may be a result of the trust created between government and other stakeholders through direct interactions. In other countries however, capacity of stakeholder is still weak, thus, deliberate efforts to develop stakeholder capacities may be imperative.

The uniqueness of the CAADP Joint Sector Review is that they have now triggered awareness and mutual accountability in agriculture at several platforms in countries, RECs and the Africa Union. Data availability is one of the key success factors in these processes. Therefore, there is a greater need to build capacity of actors and institutions for the appropriation of these processes, mostly on the production of quality data. Furthermore, there is a need to review tools and instruments, as well as the coordination mechanism and roadmap for the JSR.

The JSR is a more proactive manner, in designing required actions through the NAIP to close identified performance gaps. Furthermore, the important questions to be addressed by a country should not necessary be the score at the BR, but whether it is on track with regard to the Malabo commitments, and finally, if it is in the right growth path to close the identified gaps.

The major missing links in the current JSR processes identified include: (i) Poor consultation process of NSA; (ii) Condescending attitude of bureaucracy is a real drawback during the JSR; (iii) Feeling of exclusion from the implementation of NAIP and RAIP by NSA; (iv) Lack of sufficient resources for the JSR; (v) Lack of interest and commitment by the leadership of the various stakeholders; (vi) Unclear mandate of the JSR coordination platforms; (vii) Inefficient communication channel for NAIPs and JSR.

From the synthesis of findings on the JSR processes, several recommendations are to the RECS, countries and AUC-NEPAD/CAADP in order to scale up the JSR processes.

**Key recommendation made to the RECS are:** (i) Establish and communicate a predictable regional JSR calendar; (ii) Ensure adequate human and financial resources are mobilized for the regional JSR process; (iii) Invest in mobilizing political, technical and financial support for implementation of agriculture and food security policies and programmes including the regional JSR; (iv) Facilitate country ownership of best practices in the JSR as well as BR towards achieving the Malabo commitments; (v) Have a certain percentage of commissioned projects dedicated for implementation by local NSA; (vi) Entrench a culture of using evidence in policy and decision-making processes.

**Recommendations made to the countries include:** (i) Improve participation of the Private Sector, NGO, FBO, Women and Youth in the NAIP implementation for accountability and quality of the JSR processes; (ii) Implement the necessary further policies and institutional reforms to adopt the JSR processes in the context of the global pandemics of COVID-19, and use the new information and communication technology to keep the momentum; (iii) Strengthen institutional and human capacity in data collection and analysis for the JSR and BR report; (iv) Set up appropriate mechanisms for a sustainable funding of the NAIP, JSR and its mutual accountability framework; (v) Set up appropriate mechanisms for following up on the decisions and recommendations arising from the JSR and involve NSA in M&E and dialogue framework, even out of JSR meetings to meet up with Malabo commitments; (vi) Institute 2 annual JSRs as in Rwanda, and follow it up to ensure that action points and gaps are considered in the budget planning of sector ministries; (vii) Strengthen intersectoral coordination and establish innovative platforms for sharing data across ministries, departments, and agencies; (viii) Strengthen the communication channel between sector ministries; (ix) For countries which have the National Institute of Statistics that produce data on social, economic, environment, trade, a staff should be a member of the Technical Secretariat of the NAIP, so as to provide the necessary data, and for those indicators that have not been measured so far, to start working eventually on them; (x) Broaden the role of NSA in the JSR process and increase awareness of its importance of their participation; (xi) Organize and carry the National Census of Agriculture: Country-level monitoring of the progress towards the Malabo commitment, and other needs such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that have become an important element in formulating economic development strategies, and countries have begun to focus on the need for these indicators as a key component of the national statistical programme. A census of agriculture is one of the largest national statistical collections undertaken by a country, and its data for monitoring the Malabo commitments and SDGs should be taken seriously into consideration; and (xi) Governments should be proactive and continue to take the lead. It is not surprising that the JSRs are more advanced with a more proactive government. Governments should take JSRs seriously and must lead them, which entails using their own financing.

**Recommendations addressed to AUC-AUDA-NEPAD/CAADP to strengthening mutual accountability for the next BR will require:** (i) Strengthen the agriculture JSRs which are the bedrock for an inclusive and comprehensive BR process and make them an integral part of the BR process going forward. (ii) Initiate the process early to ensure that countries and RECs have adequate time to execute all key steps of the BR roadmap; (iii) Improve capacities in countries for data collection and quality assurance, M&E, and analysis systems; (iv) Facilitate access to country knowledge networks such as country Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) platforms where they exist to support data collection and analysis efforts; and (v) Promote country ownership of the BR process including in countries that have dedicated budget lines to finance the BR process.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background and Context

In 2003, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Maputo Declaration on the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), setting broad targets of 6% annual growth in agricultural GDP and allocating at least 10% of public expenditures to the agricultural sector. The leaders stated their intentions to achieve these targets through collective action across the continent, by improving agricultural planning and policies, scaling up investment to implement these plans and policies and harmonizing external support for African-owned plans.

About ten years later, in June 2014 in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), the AU Heads of State and Government adopted seven Commitments in the Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation (ref: Doc. Assembly/AU/2(XXIII)). These Commitments were designed to achieve agricultural transformation by 2025 and comprised of: (i) Recommitting to CAADP principles and values, (ii) Enhancing investment finance in agriculture, (iii) Ending hunger by 2025, (iv) Reducing poverty by half, by 2025, through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation, (v) Boosting intra-Africa trade in agricultural commodities and services, (vi) Enhancing resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and other related risks, and (vii) Mutual accountability to actions and results.

The novel features of the Malabo Declaration (2014) are the emphasis on implementation and Mutual Accountability enshrined in the last commitment made by the Head of States. Answering to this call for results and accountability by Member States, the stakeholders including the AUC, AUDA-NEPAD, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), countries and development partners established the Biennial Review as the tracking and reporting mechanism for performance against the Malabo targets.

Mutual Accountability means that each Stakeholder takes accountability and responsibility for their actions within the framework of collective action. In the context of CAADP, it is critical that collective action processes are clearly defined within an agreed joint operational framework to ensure that each stakeholder effectively plays their role to assist in making the others successful in the achievement of the agricultural sector's development objectives. At the country and regional levels, the Joint Sector Review (JSR) is a key instrument for achieving this accountability. At the national level, it is a government-led exercise initiated and driven by the designated Ministry responsible for Agriculture and/or a designated national coordinating entity. At the Regional Economic Communities, it is driven by the Department in charge of Agriculture. The JSRs are a key instrument for supporting mutual accountability and for implementing the CAADP Results Framework. The JSR seeks to; review the remaining key implementation challenges in the sector; assess progress against strategic reform priorities and toward expected outputs and outcomes; and develop clear recommendations to prioritize reforms that feed into medium-term planning and budgeting exercises.

The key principles of a Joint Sector Review include: (i) National ownership and leadership, (ii) Relevance to NAIP or cooperation agreement, (iii) Inclusive participation, (iv) Commitment to results by all participants, (v) Impartiality and evidence-based, (vi) Enhance national planning, (vii) Sensitivity to gender, and (viii) Learning experience.

## 1.2. Objectives

The objective of this study is to assess agricultural JSRs experiences within countries and RECs, with the ultimate goal to support the efforts of scaling up the practices across the continent. The specific objectives are: (i) Identify RECs and countries with experiences in conducting the JSR, (ii) Assess the institutional arrangement of the JSR and division of labor among the sectoral players, (iii) Assess the relevant practices by the selected RECs and countries in conducting the JSR, (iv) Assess the budget planning process in relation with the Agricultural Sector Working Groups and JSRs, (v) Highlight key success factors in implementing the JSR in these countries and RECs, (vi) Formulate recommendations on the domestication of these practices by other countries and RECs in line with the Biennial Review (BR) reporting mechanism, and (vii) Assess the communication strategy of the JSR findings.

## 1.3. Methodological approach

### 1.3.1. Data collection

This study was based on desk reviews and stakeholder consultations in 5 countries and 2 RECs:

- ▶ Desk reviews were used to gather information to address various issues on policies, institutions, previous JSR reports published by the countries and RECs in the agricultural and rural sector, and commitments relating to assessment objectives. It analyzed existing agriculture policies and programs (national development plans) of the countries and RECs, and the stakeholder's involvement and their roles.
- ▶ Information was collected from stakeholders and from key informants during consultations, to identify gaps and possible improvements in the JSR processes.
- ▶ Some feedback was collected from both the countries and the RECs using the structured interviews forms, on how the JSR could be better aligned with the BR exercise, especially in the context of the e-biennial review (alignment with the BR calendar, type of platform used for the data collection, analysis, and reporting).
- ▶ Information was sought out on the need for additional mechanisms which could complement or support the JSRs exercise in pursuit of accountability in the agricultural sector at the national level, especially as part of the implementation of the recommendations emanating from the JSR report.
- ▶ Guidance was sought out from the RECs on the role played by the regional JSRs in addressing some of the concerns raised during the 2019 BR preparation, in terms of their member states data quality review and validation. Collecting their inputs on this issue was therefore useful.
- ▶ Respondents were first screened based on their knowledge of policies, cooperation agreement programs, and institutional structures within the agricultural and rural sector.
- ▶ The study used several approaches in collecting information from stakeholders, and these included: (i) Consultation with the Ministries and RECs Departments in charge of the agricultural and rural sector; (ii) Structured interviews with stakeholders mostly on-line, through "Zoom", WhatsApp, telephone, or e-mail, in the context of confinement due to the covid-19 pandemic; (iii) Consultation with Development Partners (DPs), Research and Training Institutions, and Non-State Actors. The discussions were guided by pre-designed checklists. Information was also gathered through consultation.

To broadly cover the JSR process, key issues were discussed that included: (i) Planning (key stakeholders involved: analysis of division of labor among sectoral players including Government (line ministries, ministry of finance) and other partners, (ii) Data collection and analysis, (iii) JSR meeting organization, (iv) Dissemination and, (v) Follow-up of the JSR recommendations.

Further analysis included: (i) Gaps and relevant action plans to fill them, and (ii) Policy issues such as existing and emerging policies (quality of planning and execution, consistency and alignment of policies), institutional issues such as cooperation, implementation, capacity, financial and nonfinancial commitments by stakeholders in the sector.

### 1.3.2. Target RECs and countries

The proposed RECs assessed in the study were: (i) The East African Community (EAC), and (ii) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These RECs were selected because of their advancement in the implementation of the CAADP framework.

The targeted countries assessed in this study were: Rwanda and Kenya in East Africa; and Senegal and Nigeria in West Africa. The fifth country was Cameroon based on the fact it is the most advanced country in Central Africa in the implementation of the CAADP framework.

### 1.3.3. Data analysis, and interpretation

Data was collected using checklists (Annexes 2, 3, 4, and 5). The bulk of these qualitative data and desk reviews were analyzed to generate a draft report. This was presented to CAADP/NEPAD for internal review, comments, and observations.

### 1.3.4. Structure of the report

The report is organized in eight (6) chapters: Chapter 1 is the introduction which presents the context, the objectives of the assessment, and describes the methodology that was used to carry out the study. Chapter 2 provides a review of the JSR processes for mutual accountability and reporting mechanism of performance against the Malabo targets in the selected countries and RECs. Chapter 3 focuses on the analysis of key issues raised by non-state actors. Chapter 4 discusses the effect of the JSR on the Biennial Report performance of selected countries. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the study, while Chapter 6 proposes some recommendations on how to scale up the JSR experience and how RECs/countries can embrace the JSR and what are the must for its processes.




Figure 1: Target RECs and countries

Source: Author, 2020

Table 1: Population growth in selected countries in 2017

Country	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total pop (millions)	Rural pop (% total pop)	Rural pop growth (annual %)
Senegal	196 722	15.85	55.6	2.2
Nigeria	923 773	190.89	50.6	1.0
Cameroon	475 442	24.05	44.5	1.4
Rwanda	26 338	12.21	69.3	1.0
Kenya	580 370	49.70	73.5	1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	24 265 000	1 136	58.7	1.7

Source: Adapted from World Development Indicators

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators>



## II. THE JSR PROCESSES IN ECOWAS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN WEST AFRICA

### 2.1. The JSR processes in ECOWAS

#### 2.1.1. ECOWAP for implementing CAADP in West Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organization of 15 West African countries established on 28 May 1975. Its main goal is the promotion of the economic integration among its members. Indeed, ECOWAS is one of the five regional pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC)<sup>1</sup>.

The agricultural sector plays a determining role in the economic and social development of ECOWAS. As the foundation of the economy and of multiple societal challenges, agriculture is indispensable for national economies and income generation. Agricultural exports occupy a preeminent place in the West Africa's external trade. Furthermore, agriculture is one of the major vehicles for regional market integration.

Since early 2000s, West Africa has stimulated a political dialogue involving member countries, socio-professional actors, civil society, and development partners to define a regional agricultural policy. The dialogue focused on reviewing the regional agricultural sector, its development potential, the strengths and weaknesses of national agricultural sectors, and the issues and challenges in West Africa regarding agriculture and food and nutrition security.

As a result of this process, the Heads of States adopted in 2005, the Agricultural Policy of the West African States, ECOWAP, as an instrument for implementing CAADP. This policy has a vision of "a modern and sustainable agriculture, based on the effectiveness and efficiency of family farms and the promotion of agricultural enterprises through the involvement of the private sector. Productive and competitive in the intra Community and International markets, it must ensure food security and remunerative incomes to its workers."

The ECOWAP steering system is based on the principle of systematic consultation amongst stakeholders, including States, the ECOWAS Commission, producers' organizations networks, pastoralists and fishermen, women's networks (Gender Group), civil society organizations and the private sector.

The ECOWAP implementation is based on an institutional mechanism composed of different guidance, steering, decision-making, implementation, financing, monitoring and evaluation bodies. The overall responsibility of the implementation of ECOWAP falls under the DAEWR /DARD. The ECOWAP's operationalization is based (I) on the 15 NAIPFNS implemented at the country level and (II) on the RAIPFNS at the regional level. The NAIP-FNS are under the responsibility of the Member State, through the Ministry of Agriculture.

#### 2.1.2. The Regional JSR processes in strengthening the implementation of NAIPs/RAIP in West Africa

Since the adoption of ECOWAP, the ECOWAS Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat worked together with Member States to elaborate and adopt an action plan for joint implementation of the regional agricultural policy and CAADP. ECOWAS Member Countries, therefore, have a single, unified framework for planning and intervention in the agricultural sector. In this context, the ECOWAS Commission coordinated the preparation of National Agricultural Investment

<sup>1</sup> The 15 members of the ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Programs (NAIP) in the 15 Member States. It also provided important support to formulate quality programs and foster dialogue among actors in each country. It supported the organization of national roundtables for the adoption of the proposals. The Commission supported the implementation of NAIPS through resource mobilization from Development Partners. The different operational groups include:

- ▶ Technical co-operation organizations (CORAF/WECARD, CILSS, Hub Rural, IFDC, AfricaRice, CIRDES, etc.), PO networks (ROPPA, RBM, APSS, CORET),
- ▶ Inter-professions (ROAC, COFENABVI), the Gender Network, the Private Sector (FCCIAO, RECAO, etc.), the civil society (POSCAO/Enda CACID);
- ▶ Other ECOWAS institutions such as the Regional Centre for Animal Health, WAHO (nutrition);
- ▶ International institutions: FAO, WFP, IFPRI, ICRISAT, IITA, ReSAKSS, SWAC/OECD, etc.;
- ▶ Regional and international banks: EBID, BOAD, AfDB, IDB, WB;
- ▶ Private and consulting firms as well as regional and international NGOs.

The major stakeholders' groups of the ECOWAP are presented in Figure 2 that also includes developing partners, the private sector, and technical institutions. With its partners, ECOWAS have been committed to organize the implementation of ECOWAP around mobilizing and federating programs, which combine policy reforms and investments that can help to create a business, physical, informational, and institutional environment conducive to a massive transformation of production systems and agricultural value chains in West Africa. Right from the start, the preparation of the ECOWAP aimed at defining a framework for the integration, coordination and consistency of the main policies and programs implemented within the region. These are evaluated during a Regional Joint Sector Review, on a regular basis.

The achievement of the objectives of the ECOWAS Regional Agricultural Policy by 2025 (ECOWAP 2025), through the Regional Agricultural Investment and Food Security and Nutrition Plan (RAIFSNP) and National Agricultural Investment and Food Security and Nutrition Plan (NAIFSNP), requires a constant reinforcement of stakeholders' capacities regarding the ambitions and the challenges of this Policy. To this end, the ECOWAS Commission initiated a process for defining and implementing a Regional Strategy with a capacity building action plan for key stakeholders involved in the implementation of ECOWAP 2025. This has made it possible for a new group to pull the private sector in support of ECOWAP.

The capacity-building strategy ultimately aims to provide stakeholders (member States, non-State actors, regional technical cooperation institutions, regional integration institutions, platforms for dialogue and consultation) with the institutional and technical capacities necessary for the effective and efficient implementation of ECOWAP 2025.


### 2.1.3. The Regional Joint Sector Review of ECOWAS

The ECOWAP/CAADP stakeholders reviewed, at the end of 2015, the past ten years of implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP: ECOWAP+10. This International Conference addressed the following main dimensions: (I) Increased mobilization of internal and external resources for agriculture; (II) Increased agricultural production; (III) Increased trade between countries of the region; (IV) Improving food and nutrition security; (V) Improving income and reducing poverty; and (VI) ECOWAP institutional arrangements and governance.

ECOWAP +10 attracted more than 500 participants from 15 members states and the developing partners from abroad. ECOWAP+10 was designed in the form of plenary sessions and side events on thematic issues and a fair to portray achievements after 10 years of the implementation of ECOWAP, to evaluate it, and to prepare à new vision for 2025 in the transformation of West Africa agriculture. This Regional Joint Sector Review was planned and implemented by following the 13 JSR building blocks proposed by CAADP to insure mutual accountability. At each stage, interventions and contributions were registered from: (i) the NAIP focal points of member states or ministers in charge of agriculture, (ii) the producers’ organizations and networks, (iii) civil society organizations, (iii) the private sector, (iv) the gender networks, (v) regional and international technical institutions, and the developing partners. It helps at regional level to foster peer review and knowledge sharing.

**2.1.4. Frequent JSR like-meetings organized by ECOWAS**

The latest regional meeting was recently held in December 2019 in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, to review progress and perspectives of ECOWAP/CAADP 2025. The objective of the meeting was to make a participatory and inclusive assessment of the level of implementation of the orientations of ECOWAP 2025, and of the development perspectives of the agro-agricultural sector for the next three years (2020-2022).



**Figure 2: Key stakeholder groups of the ECOWAP**

Source: Author, 2020

### 2.1.5. Non-State Actors are key players in the RAIP and the JSR processes.

Gender and Farmers organizations (Box 1), as well as the private sector (Box 2) are among key actors in the implementation of ECOWAP and in the JSR processes.

#### Box 1: Gender and FBOs in West Africa:

The overall objective of WAWA (AFAO) is to mobilize women from all the 16 ECOWAS countries around the problem of African economic integration through real consideration of gender issue in dealing with African women's concerns. It also implicates the young generations whose useful expertise for the association is acknowledged. Its main actions are built around the following issues, which are key factors in promoting the economic status of women/youth in Africa: Capacity Building of Women and Youths; Income-generating activities and fight against poverty; Environment and Climate Change; Leadership in Gender and Good Governance; Agriculture and Food; Market Access; Access to water and energy.

WAWA has carried out with the support of its technical and financial partners many activities in favor of the socio-economic development of women. Although an umbrella organization, most of the actions carried out in recent years have focused on agriculture, particularly in building the capacities of women in modern techniques for processing agricultural products. So, the Association of West African Women (WAWA), support State policies in the area of agriculture, to put women at the heart of agricultural policies in our states.

**The Network of African Breeders and Pastoralists Organizations (RBM)**, named the Billital Maroobé network (RBM - Promotion of pastoralists), is a non-profit, apolitical, and open association. It was created in 2003 by three breeders' organizations from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to debate on regional issues related to livestock and pastoralism. RBM has extended to six other countries: Benin, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, and Togo. Today, the network has 80 professional organizations with a total of 750,000 members and 2,500,000 beneficiaries.

The RBM provides capacity building to organizations and leaders, advocacy for breeders and pastoralists by incorporating their concerns in policy development, management, and prevention of conflicts for secure production, peace, and security.

The principle of RBM's governance is an illustration of the multi-stakeholder dialogue on the promotion of local milk (improvement of quality, increase in the quantities collected and market shares), mutual responsibility, respect for gender and exchanges of experiences. In addition, the RBM has set up a Collective of Women Pastors, a dialogue to promote the involvement of women in the operations.

The **Association pour la Promotion de l'Élevage au Sahel et en Savane (APESS)** founded in 1989 in Bobo Dioulasso in Burkina Faso, is an international organization of breeders from West and Central Africa.

Members of the regional offices of a country meet in a general assembly and set up a governing body / country called the National Coordination Unit (CNC). The Association has set up operational bodies, which are the General Secretariat at the top and the Inter-country Centers for Regional Coordination (CRIPA) at the cluster level to implement the activities initiated and programmed by the Board of Directors in accordance with the options and orientations decided by the General Assembly. The General Secretariat and the CRIPAs operate under the direction of the General Secretary of APESS acting as Executive Secretary of the association.

The **Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (ROPPA)** is an initiative specific to farmers' organizations and agricultural producers in West Africa. It was created in June 2000 in Cotonou and brings together national farmers' organizations from 13 countries- Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo- and associated farmers' organizations from Cape Verde and Nigeria. Its mission is to promote the development of family farms and peasant agriculture while controlling policies related to the liberalization of national economies and the globalization of trade. ROPPA is considered as a tool for the defense and promotion of family farms in West Africa. It also operates on peasant solidarity which gives a sense of belonging to everyone by associating all categories of Peasant Organizations and Agricultural Producers in each country and supports its members in the recognition of their identity, rights, and roles. The ROPPA members are the platforms of Farmers' Organizations and Agricultural Producers (CNOP). Each national platform contains a variety of umbrella organizations of farmers, breeders, fishermen, loggers, etc. ROPPA is open to women, men, and youth whose lives and work depend on family farming systems.

#### 2.1.6. Conduct the JSR Meeting in West Africa

The meeting is usually organized during 2 to 3 days, using various formats (plenary, small groups, field visit, etc.) to allow stakeholders to discuss/verify the evidence and recommendations presented in the JSR Report. The process assists in identifying sector priorities and policies and specific actions for the different stakeholders to put in place.

#### Box 2: A model platform for integration of States-private sector in West Africa (FEWACCI)

Established in 1976, FEWACCI is the foremost Organized Private Sector (OPS) organization in the ECOWAS Region that serves as a platform for exchanges and cooperation between ECOWAS member States of the private sector to support the regional economic integration.

It regroups National Chambers of Commerce and Industry in West Africa and promotes economic development and regional integration through a mandate, by enhancing connections and communications between businesses as well as developing new exports markets, facilitating cross-border investments and creating community enterprises. FEWACCI legally has an Observer Status at ECOWAS Heads of State Summit.

FEWACCI is a key member of the ECOWAS Regional Business Association, working with the Commission as a vehicle for; advocacy, implementation of agreed programs, improvement of the business climate, competition, and fosterage of innovations, surveillance of selected ECOWAS Policy and Protocols. For example, free transnational movement of people and goods, residency, partnership for investments in integrative projects with guarantee for good operation and the necessary diplomatic and political support.

#### Some of the key achievements of FEWACCI are:

- ▶ Creation of ECOBANK and Asky as Regional/Transnational companies.
- ▶ Revitalization of FEWACCI in 2009 with the support of ECOWAS Commission, to carry on the creation of Transnational Companies that started in 1985.
- ▶ Establishment of FEWACCI Secretariat inside the ECOWAS Commission since February 2010.
- ▶ Presentation of regional private sector position in political decision-making by utilizing the Observer Status at the Summit of Heads of State and Government.
- ▶ Work with stakeholders for the effective implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free transnational movement of people and goods in the region.

FEWACCI JOIN VENTURE COUNCIL (JVC) represents a dynamic framework to establish a strategic partnership between Private sector actors in Member States through the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry with objective to foster bilateral development and cooperation in trade, investment, technology transfer, information and services. FEWACCI strongly believes in the instrumental role of the JVCs to trigger the national and regional economic growth & investment prospects. FEWACCI Identifies business opportunities in each country, and promote regional joint ventures, PPPs, Investment projects and community enterprises. For example, one or two of the non-oil producing countries could build refinery facilities to cater for the needs of all ECOWAS countries using the crude oil produced by the oil-producing countries. This will save the cost of building refineries in each of the countries producing crude oil, as well as obviate the need to import finished products from outside the region. Not only will this lead to job creation for the indigenes of ECOWAS, it will also save on foreign exchange involved in importing the finished products from outside the region. Equally, countries with lime stone deposits could produce the cement requirements of the region, instead of each country importing clinker from outside the region for processing into cement.

One advantage of economies of scale of production in such an arrangement is lower production costs, hence cheaper prices of these products for the ECOWAS consumers. Another benefit of the intra-regional partnership is the establishment of air, rail and sea transport facilities catering specifically for the ECOWAS region. FEWACCI can facilitate these operations through regional Joint ventures and Public-Private Partnership.

#### 2.1.7. Funding RAIP and the JSR

The ECOWAP Donors Group brings together the main financial partners that support the implementation of this Policy. Established in 2010 under the impetus of the Spanish Cooperation, this group was hailed at its beginning as a useful and innovative initiative on the continent. One of its major achievements is the development of a database of regionally funded projects and programs in the agriculture, food security and nutrition sector. Part of their supports go to funding the JSR processes to complement those from member States, the ECOWAS Commission, and the scientific and technical organizations.

For its co-ordination, a rotating presidency has been set up. Since the establishment of this presidency, the lead was first taken by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID) from 2010 to 2015 and then by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 2016 to December 7, 2018. The French Agency for Development (AFD) that has just taken over from USAID will have to mobilize more synergies to support the implementation of ECOWAP 2025.

#### 2.1.8. ECOWAP Scientific and Technical Institutions support M & E and Learning

**IFPRI** was established at the West and Central Africa Office (WCAO) in 2010 to better meet local research and capacity needs for reducing poverty and ending malnutrition in the region. IFPRI provide evidence-based agricultural policy solutions and capacity-strengthening support.

**ReSAKSS** (The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System) of IFPRI, maps CAADP indicators across countries and regions, track progress towards CAADP goals and targets, monitors progress on establishing comprehensive, inclusive, and regular agricultural joint sector reviews. It also analyzes the trajectory of the benchmark

and its implications for the effort required of countries to remain on-track or get on-track toward achieving the goals and targets of the Malabo Declaration by 2025. It has also analyzed the change in the overall score obtained by different countries between the 2018 and 2020 BRs.

**CORAF:** Africa's largest sub-regional research organization based in Dakar, with four main functions: (i) coordination and capacity strengthening; (ii) scaling technologies and innovations; (iii) creating an enabling environment at the regional level for technology flows and increased trade, and (iv) knowledge management and learning in support of agricultural transformation in West and Central Africa. It does implement major research and development programs of ECOWAP among which the WAAPP and WASP.

### 2.1.9. The communications plan of ECOWAP/RAIP

The communication plan distinguishes between: (i) Information and communication on policy and programmes targeting the beneficiaries of the policy (producers, economic agents, NGOs, etc.); (ii) Information and communication to ECOWAP's stakeholders and their members (States, POs, private sector, gender network, NGOs, etc.); (iii) Information and communication to ECOWAP's international partners. It focuses on the differentiation of the contents and the level of processing of information according to the target audience, and the differentiation of information and communication media.

## 2.2. Gaps in the ECOWAP implementation

Despite significant progress in the ECOWAP implementation, many challenges remain. Among these, are: (i) The virtual lack of gender mainstreaming within the RAIP and NAIPs; (ii) The poor consideration of livestock and pastoralism and the need to define a common vision shared by the Sahelian and coastal countries; (iii) Very little consideration of private sector actors, except for family farmers. This deficiency is partly due to the low degree of organization of these actors at regional level despite significant progress made in that area both in terms of the organization of the actors and their representation in policy dialogue and consultations forums at national level; (iv) The inadequate alignment of technical and financial Partners with NAIPs and RAIP priorities, despite considerable progress in policy dialogue and consultation with regional actors; (v) In the absence of a financial instrument recognized by the various stakeholders; (vi) The financing system for the agricultural sector, particularly family farms, and value chains (marketing, processing, storage, distribution) remains weak; (vii) A set of instruments defined in the RAIP remains difficult to operationalize because of the weakness of regional, national and local institutions as well as the lack of resources; (viii) The weakness of the land and pastoral security system; and (ix) The weakness of the monitoring and evaluation system (M&E), which is strongly linked to the shortcomings of the national and regional information systems.



## 2.3. The JSR process in Senegal

### 2.3.1. Country context

The agriculture sector of Senegal remains a key driver of the economy and a lever for inclusive growth, food security, employment, and poverty reduction. It employs 77 per cent of the workforce, representing over 60 per cent of the population and 60 per cent of workers in the agriculture sector are women. Approximately 70 per cent of the rural population depends on agriculture or related activities for their livelihoods.

The current Government policy and institutional framework is The Emerging Senegal Plan (PES), introduced in 2014, aims at strong, inclusive, and sustainable growth to promote the well-being of populations through structural transformation of the economy. The plan's 10-year strategy (2014-2023) rests on three pillars: (i) structural transformation of the economy and growth; (ii) human capital, social protection, and sustainable development; and (iii) governance, institutions, peace, and security. A second action plan (2019-2023) is being finalized.

Phase II of the Senegal Agriculture Acceleration Program (PRACAS) – the agricultural component of PES – proposes to: (i) improve the production and productivity of subsistence crops such as millet, sorghum, maize, fonio and black-eyed peas; (ii) optimize of the performance of industrial value chains such as those for groundnuts, rice, processed tomatoes, cotton and sesame; (iii) develop fruit and vegetable exports such as green beans, mangoes and melons; and (iv) increase production to meet national needs for crops such as onions, potatoes and bananas.

### 2.3.2. The JSR process as implemented in Senegal

**Set Up a Joint Sector Review (JSR) Steering Committee** To comply with the commitments made in Malabo in 2014, Senegal has already held 4 JSRs to date, with the most recent in December 2018. The Agricultural Joint Sector Review Steering Committee is established.

**Establish a JSR Secretariat:** the coordination and of activities and all the JSR related operations is done by the DAPSA. But no evidence of a multi-stakeholders JSR secretariat to carrying out the planning and implementation.

**Develop Terms of Reference (ToR) for the JSR:** to conduct JSR studies, the committee and the DAPSA develop the terms of reference for the JSR and shares with other stakeholders.

**Mobilize resources:** The government, the development partners and the private sector mobilized financial and human resources to support the JSR. The financing mechanism of the sector is largely dominated by development partners and the private sector, while public contribution is still relatively low. To fulfill their functions properly, the agro-pastoral sector requires a convergence of sub-sector policies and strategies and a good mobilization of the financial resources necessary for their effective implementation.

**The JSR is carried out by a broad and inclusive group.** Technical and Financial Partners in support of rural development and food and nutritional security, such as USAID, FAO, Canadian Cooperation, Italian Cooperation, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Bank of Development participated in the meeting. Civil society and the private sector- National Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, TROPICASEM Agroalimentaire, etc. also participated in the meeting in their capacity as non-State actors.



**Commission JSR Studies:** under the supervision of the Steering Committee, Consultants are hired to conduct JSR. The work is done in close collaboration with the Committee and the staff of the DAPSA.

**Establish JSR Review Team:** As in previous years, a JSR Review Team was established. Teams made up of a multi-stakeholder group (state and nonstate actors) with technical expertise reviewed and commented on various JSR studies and reports and ensured that outputs of reviews were effectively implemented.

**Preparation of the JSR Report:** The JSR report results from a high-quality policy review and data collection. The draft resulting is later sent to the various stakeholders for ownership. The document with their needs and suggestions, then be discussed through several consultation meetings with excellent facilitation of Hub Rural.

**Preparation of the NAFSIP (2018-2025) to be adopted during the JSR meeting:** a series of consultations with stakeholders in agricultural development was organized around a draft report on the review of public development policies and strategies, the status of implementation of commitments and recommendations, level of funding and performance achieved.

**JSR meeting:** At the initiative of the Government of Senegal, the JSR meeting was held to review the results achieved in 2017 financial year, and to jointly validate the new National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (NAFSIP) 2018-2025, that was developed to translate into actions the commitments made within the framework of ECOWAP and CAADP, and the orientations adopted in its current and prospective agricultural policy (PES) and strategy documents (PRACAS). The 2018 JSR, chaired by the Minister Delegate in charge of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, brought about 150 people from all categories of stakeholders in agricultural development, for two (2) days, using various formats (plenary and small groups) to allow stakeholders to discuss/verify the evidence and recommendations presented in the JSR Report and the NAFSIP (2018-2025).

**Follow up on JSR Meeting Actions:** one of the major weaknesses of the JSR process in Senegal is that there is no evidence of a closed follow up of the recommendations and decisions of the JSR meeting. There is thus a need to Strengthen the monitoring and evaluation system for better consideration of the recommendations.

Share JSR experiences with other countries: At regional level like the ECOWAP assessment workshop held in Conakry 2019, Senegal shared its experience in JSR.

**Communication of results, output, and impact to stakeholders:** After discussions with stakeholders, the final report from the consensus between actors is shared.

**Private sector and non-state actors stand alongside the Government:** The NAFSIP is developed to accelerate growth, achieve food security, and reduce poverty. It is part of the perspective of modern and sustainable agriculture, productive and competitive on intra- and extra-community markets, based on the effectiveness and efficiency of family farms and the promotion of agricultural businesses through involvement of the private sector. Furthermore, the Non-State Actors intends to stand alongside the Government for the establishment of local production and processing companies necessary to fight against poverty and the improvement of economic growth within the framework of NAFSIP/CAADP pact. These commitments should be formalized by signing a letter of intent to invest and establishing an internal consultation framework that would make it possible for stakeholders to assess the effective implementation of the NAFSIP.

In order to fulfill their functions properly, the agro-pastoral sector requires a convergence of sub-sector policies and strategies and a good mobilization of the financial resources necessary for their effective implementation. The financing mechanism of the sector is largely dominated by development partners and the private sector, while public contribution is still relatively low.

Fortunately, in the desire to boost agro-pastoral development, the Government has made a substantial financial commitment through public subsidy of inputs and equipment, as well as the establishment of lines of credit, guarantee funds, bonuses, and guarantee calamity, thanks to the key roles played by the Non-State Actors' convincing power. Government actions are also complemented by the mobilization of the "Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS)", which supports the stakeholders of all the value chains. The Government also supports the development of professional organizations in all sub-sector, with a view to scale up the financing model as developed by the CNCR, which would greatly improve the system of financing productive activities of the private sector, in general, and family farms, in particular.

The national private enterprises also invest in the acquisition of inputs and equipment, production, processing, and marketing of food products. These family farms which are SMEs, are the dominant players in the national production system.

Globally, development aid is always higher than domestic funding, which until to-date, makes the system very fragile. This aid could only be effective if there is a substantial mobilization of domestic resources, both public and private.

**Table 2: Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review in Senegal**

Category of Participants	2018	%
Ministers, Local government (political and technical), Staff of Sectorial Ministries and their agencies		
Other ministries and agencies	66	52
Members of parliament	1	0.8
Non-State actors (Nongovernmental and civil society organizations, Farmers' groups, and organizations)	27	21.3
Development partners and International Organizations	21	16.5
Research and training institutions	6	4.7
Private sector	6	4.7
Total	115	100

**Source:** Author, 2020

Existing JSR-like processes: Senegal does implement several processes similar to the JSR. These include annual sector reviews to provide information on the implementation of the economic and social policy document, the annual performance reports to assess the implementation of medium-term sector expenditure frameworks (CDSMT) and the Annual Agricultural Report (RAA), to provide information on the implementation of the Agro-sylvo-pastoral Orientation

Law (LOASP). The latter most closely resembles JSR processes. These JSR-like processes are being presented in the Agricultural Joint Sector Review Reports since 2014.

**The key features of the JSR processes in Senegal are:**

- ▶ The high-level participation of Government officials and the attention they pay to the agricultural development. This is a result of the fighting spirit of the Non-State Actors to bring their concerns to the attention of elected officials.
- ▶ Senegal has a long history of having good dialogues with Non-State Actors such as farmers, agribusinesses, producer organizations, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), a best practice recommended by CAADP. As recognized by CAADP, for the transformation of African agriculture in a country or region, it is imperative to build broad and inclusive coalitions committed to improving the sector's policies, programming, and institutions.
- ▶ The established structures, processes and working cultures facilitate the State and Non-State Actors partnership in Senegal. These are grounded on common vision, driven by collective responsibility, and clearly demonstrating synergies, complementarities, and mutual accountability.

The participation of NSA does improve the quality of planning policy, programs and projects. This helps in (i) improving the quality of the national or regional strategy setting, policy development and investment planning by providing ideas, evidence, and expertise; (ii) identifying and refining national priorities and growth pathways; (iii) ensuring alignment to the interests of target beneficiaries; (iv) enhancing implementation capacity, including of Non State Actors themselves; (v) enhancing accountability for delivery on behalf of target beneficiaries; and (vi) strengthening citizen responsibility.

## 2.4. The JSR processes in Nigeria

### 2.4.1. The agricultural development policies

The agricultural development trajectory in Nigeria is replete with an intriguing plethora of policies and programs with undulating sequence of implementation, especially since the late 1980s following the cessation of the regular economic development planning activities in the country. But the most remarkable changes in policies were observed when the Nigerian Vision 20: 2020 (NV20: 2020) was launched in 2009 to address challenges such as low productivity, underinvestment by the private sector, land ownership and tenure rigidities, weak research extension linkages, poor infrastructure, restricted access to credit, ageing farming population and low return on investment; persistent rural-urban population drift and unsustainable development paradigm due to short planning horizons. A full review of policies and programs is documented in the Nigeria Agricultural sector performance review 2018, which is the second to be conducted by the country.

### 2.4.2. JSR process as implemented in Nigeria

**The JSR Steering Committee** has been established in Nigeria since October 2016 and is a multi-stakeholder platform. The committee is made of six key stakeholders: public, private, CSO, farmers organizations, development partners and research institutes.

**The JSR Secretariat was established** for carrying out the planning and implementation. It comprises the representatives of all the key stakeholders. Perhaps, its capacity needs to be strengthened to better carry out its activities. There is a need also to decentralize its activities in the States. The Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Unit need to be empowered with activities at the levels of the States and local governments.

**JSR in Nigeria is carry out in a broad and inclusive group:** The Minister of Agriculture is the Chairman of the JSR-SC while the vice chairman comes from the private sector. This structuration depicts the full involvement of the private sector in the process. The JSR process in Nigeria is an example of a multi-sectoral coordinated process with the full implication of the private sector.

**Mobilize resources:** The JSR was funded from the Government resources and technical backstopping by specialized institutions. However, more resources are needed to facilitate the implementation of planned activities of the Secretariat and the Steering Committee.

**Non-state actors played key role in the JSR during the meeting.** Women and youth are key actors in the JSR process. In fact, Nigeria already emplaced schemes to include the Youth Employment in Agriculture Program, Women and Youth in Agribusiness Development, Skills Acquisition Centers, Business Support Centers, Youth Development Centers, Entrepreneurship Development Centers, Technology Business Incubation Centers, Centre for Women Development and Nigeria has so far organized two JSRs. Social Investment Program.

**The JSR Meeting:** Nigeria organized their first Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs) in 2017, in the context of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and the Agriculture Promotion Policy (APP). The JSR also recognized Nigeria's implementation of the CAADP and the ECOWAP. It recognizes that country processes are to be aided by regional initiatives in which Nigeria partakes and which are to be adapted to Nigerian peculiarities.

#### 2.4.3. A JSR-like process set up by a dynamic private sector

**Nigeria has this particularity of having a JSR-like** agricultural policy dialogue holds by the private sector, which plays a very important role in the Nigeria agricultural sector. It is in this context that the Nigeria Economic Summit Group, a private sector development advocacy outfit, also put in place an Agriculture and Food Security Policy Commission Steering Committee of private chairmanship / public co-chairmanship. That committee engages government sectors to create vital links for collaboration and partnership, sharing responsibilities, supporting capabilities, delivering initiatives, and ensuring impacts in the sector.

#### 2.4.4. A critical lack of quality data in the agricultural sector

Another factor which significantly influences the agricultural sector is related to the performance of the institutions as evaluated based on key criteria identified under the CAADP framework. Based on the seven criteria of the CAADP, Nigeria's CAADP process commences with its internalization in the country and the development of a roadmap for implementing the vision of CAADP (the MALABO declaration). The M&E system is set to monitor the performance of the NAIP and support the production of a NAIP implementation report. However, in 2016, there was no National CAADP Roadmap for implementing Malabo Declaration, and no new NAIP. The NAIP implementation is not reflected in the national budget and there is thus no implementation progress report.

CAADP process completion index is the indicator which is used to measure the extent of completion of the process. The target is 100% by 2018, that is, all African countries are expected to have developed, implemented, and reviewed the MALABO compliant NAIPs by 2018. The results show that Nigeria was short on four of the seven criteria (Table 2).

With the recent re-adoption of the CAADP during an agricultural meeting at a national council, a memo was prepared to authorize support for CAADP related initiatives. Several efforts have been made to review the previous sector strategies. The M&E system exists for tracking the performance of the NAIP (via the Key Performance Indicators), although it requires further strengthening. However, progress on the new NAIP is moving rapidly with a draft plan which was virtually ready for validation by stakeholders in the last quarter of 2017.

**Table 3: Achievements on completing CAADP Process in Nigeria**

Progress item	2016 Progress (pi) “Yes” = 100 %   “No” = 0	Malabo Targets (%)
Existence of communication on internalizing CAADP	100	100
Existence of National CAADP Roadmap for implementing Malabo	0	100
Existence of NAIP Appraisal Report	100	100
Existence of the New NAIP	0	100
NAIP implementation reflected in the national budget	0	100
Existence of NAIP M&E System	100	100
Existence of NAIP implementation progress report	0	100
CAADP process completion Index		
CAADP Pro = Average (pi)	42.86	100

**Source:** Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), Abuja. Nigeria.

### III. THE JSR PROCESSES IN EAC AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA

#### 3.1. The context of East Africa Community

The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organization with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. It is made up of six partner States: the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan; the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda. The EAC is home to 177 million people with an urban population of over 22% and a total land area of 2.5 million square kilometers.

The context of the EAC envisages a prosperous and cohesive development of the whole region by 2050 to reach an upper-middle income status. This vision 2050 is translated into five-year development strategies. Currently, EAC is implementing its 5th EAC development strategy (2016/17-2020/21) which is centered around regional people, goods, and services integration.

Agriculture is the most important sector in EAC, with about 80 percent of the population of the region living in rural areas and depending on agriculture for their livelihood. Therefore, an enabling agricultural policy framework is key to unlocking the enormous potential of the region.

### **3.2. EAC Partner States finally sign CAADP Compact**

The EAC Partner States have marked a major milestone in their aspiration of placing agriculture as the engine of social and economic growth in the integration process with the signing of the CAADP Compact. It details regional development priorities and defines actions, commitments and partnerships required to achieve agricultural transformation in line with the CAADP goals and targets. The process of developing the EAC CAADP Compact has been a lengthy, inclusive, and consultative one, and is aimed at building consensus and securing ownership among various stakeholders. It is designed to facilitate coordination of regional and cross-cutting programs which are best handled regionally, and those that complement agricultural programs and projects at the national level in the partner States.

### **3.3. EAC CAADP Results Framework**

The EAC Secretariat has a draft CAADP Results Framework developed in 2015. This is a planning and management tool which sets targets and performance indicators and presents anticipated outputs and outcomes to be tracked from the implementation of the EAC Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP). The framework is designed to guarantee a coordinated and harmonized measurement and reporting of the results.


It is well-documented that M&E reports are particularly useful inputs in mutual accountability processes where all stakeholders get to review the progress of the sector using evidence. Therefore, from this gap we note that the mutual accountability mechanism for the agriculture and food security sector has been weak and would require strengthening. Similarly, due to the lack of M&E capacity to focus on agriculture and food security issues at EAC, the secretariat has taken a long period of time to finalize the CAADP results framework. The document has therefore remained in draft form for about 4 years since its design in 2015. The EAC secretariat is aware of these M&E capacity gaps and has recently put in place some measures to address the gaps by working with technical partners with a mandate in agriculture sector M&E. These partners include the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge support System for East and Central Africa (ReSAKSS-ECA), and the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). The secretariat is also working to enhance its agricultural database, which would provide a more reliable basis for planning and M&E of the growing food security agenda.

### **3.4. The Regional Agricultural Council is JSR-like process in EAC**

EAC conducted the first assessment of its JSR process in 2017. The EAC Agricultural and Rural Development Policy and EAC Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy (2005-2030) both adopted in 2006, are the framework documents setting the agenda of the sector. Several strategies and policies are set in the EAC to guide the agricultural sector and are reviewed in the Assessment of the JSR of EAC 2017 by (ReSAKSS-ECA, 2019).

These strategies and policies are well-aligned with the EAC RAIP. The RAIP of the EAC is a tool that sets the base for the transformation of the EAC agriculture through: (a) identification of challenges that hinder sustainable

agricultural transformation in the EAC region (b) identification, prioritization and formulation of strategic interventions that would catalyze sustained agricultural transformation and (c) cost analysis of the strategic interventions, with proposed mechanisms for implementing the RAIP. This is done across five thematic areas namely: (i) Regional food supply; (ii) Food utilization; (iii) Value addition; (iv) Capacity building for sustainable natural resource management; and (v) Strengthening capacities for regional agricultural institutions. These actions are coordinated, controlled, and strengthened by another cross-cutting thematic which is the Monitoring and Evaluation.



**Figure 3: The RAIP institutional architecture**

Source: EAC, 2018

**3.5. Finding: key challenge with CAADP implementation in EAC**

The proposed activities of the EAC RAIP are estimated at 536 million USD. The sources of funding are mainly Member States themselves. Other funds may be obtained from development partners, private equity finance, sovereign wealth fund, AfDB non-sovereign investment, amongst others. A collective mobilization from partner countries, regional institutions, development partners and the private sector is needed for the implementation of the RAIP. This requires supportive national and regional policy environments that address food insecurity, poverty, regional trade, natural resource management and promotion of value addition. Even though partner states developed a policy that is well-aligned with the RAIP, there are some limitations for the implementation from both the nations and the regional level.

Though the countries have adopted CAADP/Malabo principles, they are at different levels of its domestication and implementation.

Funding is a huge problem with the implementation of the Malabo Declaration. The challenge with the CADDP is the funding. Some countries put up the JSR processes expecting that it will be funded by the regional level or external funds, rather than being self-funded. At the national level, funds for the process are supposed to be provided by countries rather than an external source, given the fact external funds are difficult and not automatic. Tanzania tried once with an external fund; Uganda did 3 times, but Kenya is still to try. Rwanda is the only country that self-funded the process and took it seriously, adopted and integrated it totally in its governance system. The process is carried out twice a year.

### 3.6. The JSR practices in Rwanda

#### 3.6.1. The country context

Rwanda is the first in Africa to achieve consistent JSR. moreover, this is performed twice per annum: the forward and the backward JSR. JSR at the beginning was a kind of mutual accountability between the Government and development partners whereby the government assessed the different donors' communities for the fund raised. In return, the implementation of activities and achievements of agreed indicators by the Government are assessed by donors. JSR brings all groups of actors to engage in policy dialogue to ensure accountability and transparency in the implementation of the sector strategy or NAIP.

#### 3.6.2. The JSR process as implemented in Rwanda

**JSR meeting: Two JSR forums** are held every year. The first one is held three months before the financial year in March or April is called the 'forward looking JSR'. During this meeting, key issues that are discussed include: policy, action plan and targets for the following financial year. The financial year for the East African Community is from July 1st to June 30th. The second JSR forum or 'backward looking' JSR which is generally held three months after the financial year in September or October, gives the government and its development partners, the private sector, NGOs, OP, etc., the opportunity to assess the sector's performance, progress, and challenges, and particularly the progress on the NAIP targets and policy actions.

**The JSR meeting brings around 150-200 people:** NGO, FBO, Development partners and government staff. The representative of development partners is the co-chair of JSR (for a NAIP life cycle which is aligned to the seven years presidential turn), selected by MINFI. All sectors' strategies are aligned with the seven-year presidential terms. The development partner who puts more money in the PSTA leads. EU was a co-chair during the previous seven years. The present co-chair is the WB, for the next seven years presidential term.

Since 2006, Rwanda has been performing JSRs as a good governance tool, long before it was instituted by CAADP. Rwanda among other African countries, is taken as a benchmark.

This has been acknowledged by ReSAKSS-ECA when mandated to carry out a review assessment of the JSR in Rwanda.



The accountability mechanism has been conducted between the government and development partners. For years, Ministries have been sensitizing the private sector and other stakeholders to participate in the JSR. Several factors ease the real implication of various stakeholders in the JSR in Rwanda. Among these is the Decentralization policy put in place since 2000 when local governments were given mandate to implement all activities, including organizing local JSRs. This facilitates the JSR at the national level because local governments conduct their joint action development forum and later send one representative with their report to the national JSR.

**JSR secretariat:** there is no evidence of a JSR secretariat. Ministries in Rwanda are only concerned with initiating the policy, making advocacy, and monitoring and evaluating the outputs and impacts. The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) has only 47 staff and the rest of the staff is in local government. Only one staff is in a charge of the NAIP in Rwanda.

Since 2018, MINAGRI has been implementing the fourth edition of the Strategic Plan for Agriculture Transformation (PSTA 4). The forward-looking JSR is an excellent venue to share the progress in the implementation of PSTA 4. The JSR forums bring together all Sector Working Group (SWG) stakeholders to engage in policy dialogue and to ensure **Ownership, Accountability and Transparency** for a better PSTA 4 implementation.

### 3.6.3. The JSR innovative practices in the context of COVID-19 pandemic

At the time of this assessment, on June 23, 2020, we participated in the JSR 2020/2021 ‘Forward Looking’ of the Agricultural Sector organized on “Zoom”, a video conference application. The JSR meeting was held online because of the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns when all flights, displacement of people and large group meetings were restricted. This was an exceptional context. The main objectives of this meeting were to: (i) present and discuss priority areas during the planning and budgeting process; (ii) discuss and validate the 2020/2021 sector targets and related policy actions; (iii) select policy related studies to be conducted in the 2020/2021 fiscal year; (iv) assess progress made towards the implementation of the fiscal year 2019/2021 policy actions, and (v) present plans and strategies for monitoring additional SDG indicators.

In this exceptional context, it was noted that the GDP decreased by 39%, poverty increased by 11% and the allocation of resources to the agricultural sector was less than expected by the CAADP. These are direct consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. To mitigate these effects, the Rwandan Government put in place the “Covid recovery plan” and invited all the stakeholders to be a part of it. The meeting was co-chaired by the World Bank representative in Rwanda, and amongst the participants, were around 80 stakeholders from the Government, Development partners, NGOs, FBOs, etc.

The attendance was lower than the usual 150-200 people as it involved people who were familiar with the



technicalities of the zoom communication tool. This led to a misrepresentation of some stakeholders like women and youth associations, and the private sector. The participants had received the JSR report PowerPoint a few days prior to the meeting, which gave them time to go through it for a better participation during the open discussion. Also, they had a few days after the JSR to send their questions and suggestions for a better contribution to the meeting. This procedure ensured that the planned activities come from a consensus, and that all the stakeholder's preoccupations were considered in the process. However, it is unfortunate to note that the private sector was not involved in all the steps of this process.

To improve the private sector implication in the process, the government promises to organize a public-private dialogue in the near future. A collaboration among sectors is key for sustainable development. Also, the government was requested to have more consideration for gender-related issues. Other specific indicators related to the private sector like their development should be added to the results framework. The budget planned includes activities aiming at empowering the private sector. These include: (i) Support on input (vegetable, fertilizers, pesticides...), (ii) Marketing, by providing support for exhibitions, to link producers to buyers, and (iii) Products' certification for the international market.

For a better satisfaction of value chain actors' needs, the government has decided to develop extension packages that are tailored towards issues and challenges expressed by farmers and other actors along the value chain. This is done through the Customized Agriculture Extension System project in Rwanda (CAES) 2021-2024. It promotes a pluralism in agriculture extension delivery mechanism where the private sector plays an important role. CAES recognizes that different agriculture value chain actors have different extension needs, ranging from production skills to market information, and this constitutes the rationale for a customized extension service.

#### 3.6.4. Key features of the JSR processes in Rwanda that can be scaled up to other countries

**Joint Performance Contract framework, a novel assessment tool for better mutual accountability:** Performance contract (PC) is a tool for assessment of mutual accountability at institutional, individual, and joint partnerships. Since 2006, the performance contracts have been central and an integral part in the coordination of national planning and implementation of government policies across all government institutions. As the country continues to aspire towards achieving its vision of becoming a middle-income country by 2020, many transformative and impactful interventions, mostly defined in EDPRS II, require joint planning, implementation, and M&E by many stakeholders with a robust coordination framework at all levels. Under this context, the joint PC framework was introduced in the planning process of the 2015/2016 financial year to ensure a well-coordinated planning, implementation, and M&E of sector annual plans. As per the EDPRS II, the key priorities within the joint PC framework include agriculture, exports, energy, job creation, urbanization and improved settlement, social protection, and service delivery. The joint performance contract is the one in which the implementation is carried out by two or more parties that are committed to results. The action plan goes beyond agriculture and at the end, all the parties are accountable for the results because they are bonded by the contract in the implementation.

The evaluation on the performance is conducted at the institutional level (ranking institutions according to the performance), individual level (who is the best at performing) or at the local level on joint contract. When a certain level of target is not attained, the assessment will show who, why, and what. The minimum acceptable performance

at individual level is 60%. Those achieving more than 60 % are rewarded based on their salary. In contrast, those performing lower than 60% are asked to write a resignation letter. Having a position is on a competitive basis. Therefore, everyone needs to compete for a job, not like a public officer, but as a contract-based worker.

Some countries implement the JSR processes only because it is recommended by the Heads of State of the African Union. Some countries lack ownership of the processes. The JSR organization should normally be under the Prime Minister's office as part of the good governance approach, to provide guidance on the results achieved and the gaps where Government attention should be directed. It should not be an organization that just produces reports to the AU or the development partners without action.

In Rwanda, the organization of the JSR does not need extra expenses: meetings are held at the MINADER premises, data is compiled from the monitoring and evaluation which is part of the system, and there is no external expert or consultant for the JSR. The processes of the JSR are well-adopted such that a change in the Government, say the appointment of a new Minister of Agriculture, does not bring about a shift of interest.

**Central and local governments coordination meetings/platforms:** This is a coordination forum which brings together high-level officials from central and local governments including ministers, governors, heads of agencies, mayors, and private sector federation representatives to debate on issues of sector coordination to enhance service delivery. These meetings are convened and chaired by the Prime Minister at least once a year. Interaction between the central and local governments through these platforms is crucial in monitoring, coordination, and fast-tracking of agricultural development programs.

**Public Private Dialogue:** The Public Private Dialogue (PPD) is a national structured mechanism established in 2012 for the private sector and the Government of Rwanda to jointly discuss key business issues and private sector constraints across different sectors to find appropriate and shared solutions. For the agricultural sector, PPD serves as a platform to exchange knowledge and find solutions to address core issues related to the agriculture value chain.

**Development Partners Coordination Group:** In response to the recommendations from the Rome high level forum on Harmonization (February, 2003), Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for development results (February, 2004), the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness (March, 2005), and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), in 2010, the Government of Rwanda established the Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) as the highest level coordination body in the country, responsible for overseeing the entire aid coordination system (MINECOFIN, 2010). The DPCG serves as a forum for policy dialogue on coordination of development aid to Rwanda to: (i) ensure its effectiveness and impact on achieving the national priorities of poverty reduction and international commitments; (ii) harmonize development partners' program, project, and budget support to Rwanda; (iii) avoid duplication; and (iv) foster aid effectiveness. Through this forum, the partners' interventions are aligned with the agricultural sector's strategic and action plans, to ensure that the planning, budgeting and implementation of the budget, program and projects are aligned and reinforce each other.

**The Biennial review is a monitoring and evaluation tool well-adopted in Rwanda:** When the NAIP is formulated, actors have a full year of reviewing the ongoing implementation and guiding its outcome. So, the planning year is based on 4 different block of elements: (i) Finance assessment of the NAIP to obtain results and how to improve what is not

done; (ii) National priorities: every cycle of government strategy has new targets; (iii) Alignment of the framework with key continental, sub-regional and national policies (CAADP, EAC,...); and (iv) Analytical work done by institutions like IFPRI (for scenarios of growth, investment options).

Indicators that are similar are kept, non-similar ones are adapted and readjusted, and the sector strategy is a document that reflects these frameworks. With a good monitoring and evaluation system, there is no extra work to report on the Biennial review because CAADP is already aligned with the NAIP.

Rwanda has already integrated the monitoring and evaluation of the NAIP, while other countries seem to be implementing two different things: their NAIP and the Biennial Report. The same person is responsible for the NAIP and the Biennial review, and produces a report every quarter, as the same source of information is used. There is no duplication of NAIP data and Biennial Review.

The Rwanda JSR represents a model that can be followed by other countries and RECs that intend to embrace the JSR. EAC took a full year to come up with the RAIP, using a participatory approach with inputs from member states. To design its own strategy and policy, there is a need to capitalize the best practices from countries to help EAC. In that regard, the Rwanda JSR was taken as an example of a good model to help EAC, which should be contextualized for each country.

### 3.7. The JSR processes in Kenya

#### 3.7.1. The country context

Kenya is an East African country, which lies on the equator. The agriculture sector is key to its economy, contributing 26 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and another 27 per cent of GDP indirectly through linkages with other sectors. It also employs more than 40 per cent of the total population and more than 70 per cent of Kenya's rural people.

#### 3.7.2. The current JSR processes as implemented in Kenya

**A JSR steering committee and a JSR Secretariat are assured by** the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU) was established in 2005 as an inter-ministerial unit and secretariat to the agricultural and rural development ministries and non-state actors. The period 2004–2010 was characterized by economic reforms in Kenya. The government was implementing the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA) 2004–2014 (Republic of Kenya, 2004), the sector strategy to actualize the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (Republic of Kenya, 2003). Agricultural services were spread across 10 government ministries, with more than 130 pieces of legislation and 34 parastatals whose mandates often conflicted or overlapped. The sector urgently needed legislative, regulatory and parastatals reforms. ASCU was therefore formed to steer the reform agenda through coordination of the multi-stakeholders and sector ministries towards the implementation of sector strategies and development agenda. Its key roles were mainly to provide a platform for linkages and collaboration of key sector players, and a platform and an enabling environment where sector-wide consultations among various implementation levels could be undertaken. Besides these roles, the unit was meant to be a referral center for agricultural sector reforms through the provision of reliable and timely information for a better resource allocation.

To better perform its mandate of coordinating activities in the various agricultural sector ministries, ASCU adopted a Sector- Wide Approach (SWAp). The structure of ASCU comprised of the National Forum, the National Steering Committee, the Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee (ICC), the Technical Committee (TC), and the Thematic Working Groups (TWGs). ICC was a committee of sector ministers and/or their permanent secretaries and donor groups that ensured sector-wide coordination and consultation. Six TWGs were formed, namely (i) Legal, Regulatory and Parastatals Reforms; (ii) Research and Extension; (iii) Agribusiness, Value Addition and Marketing; (iv) Inputs and Financial Services; (v) Food and Nutrition Policy and Programs; and (vi) Sustainable Land and Natural Resources Management. TWGs were a critical component of the coordination process. The main roles of the TWGs were to conduct in-depth analysis of relevant issues outlined in the SRA and to develop action plans and programs for resource allocation and investment. The TWGs also prepared various policy documents and provided guidance in the implementation of policies and programs within the sector. Membership of the TWGs was drawn from the private sector, NGOs, universities and senior government officers from the sector ministries, and development partners. TWG meetings were originally planned to be convened and chaired by directors of the sector ministries but were in practice chaired by private sector representatives.

Kenyan agricultural sector coordination faced challenges mostly related to policy making. In fact, Kenya's new Constitution was promulgated in 2010, ushering in a devolved system of governance. Under the new arrangement, most agricultural functions were devolved to the county level, leaving policy making at the national level. These new developments presented challenges to policy making and implementation, and subsequently to the agricultural sector coordination. In response, ASCU established county coordination units and seconded personnel to the counties to enhance the coordination of services at that level.

**Kenya experienced JSR-like processes:** Kenya, since 2010, signed the CAADP Compact and concomitantly launched the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010–2020 (ASDS, GoK 2010a), the blueprint for the country's CAADP. It intends to champion the sector-led 10 percent annual economic growth rate envisaged under the economic pillar of Kenya's Vision 2030 (GoK, 2007), and recognizes the complementary roles of both the public and the private sectors in facing the outstanding challenges in the sector.

The objective of the ASDS is declined in the Medium-Term Investment Plan (ASDS MTIP) (GoK, 2010b) under the following six pillars: (1) Increasing productivity, commercialization, and competitiveness; (2) Promoting private sector participation; (3) Promoting sustainable land and natural resources management; (4) Reforming delivery of agricultural services; (5) Increasing market access and trade; and (6) Ensuring effective coordination and implementation.

Through the implementation of the ASDS, Kenya has achieved a lot even though some major challenges remain which are mainly related to the inadequacy of the process coordination at the national and county levels of government. The absence of a well-defined framework for the policy reform process, the non-inclusive process of the policy analysis, the limited participation of the private sector, the civil society as well as the poor management of resources mitigate the expected outputs.

With the promulgation of the new Constitution, the ASDS was then obsolete and there was a need to align it to the Constitution (Royal Embassy of Denmark/DANIDA, 2010). A new strategy, the Agricultural Sector Growth and Transformation Strategy (ASGTS) is being developed to replace the ASDS and align it to the Constitution. ASCU has also

faced problems such as lack of credible and reliable data for informed decision-making, unstable staff establishment, overlap of interventions and suboptimal participation by the private sector. While the TWGs were supposed to be chaired by the private sector, this was not the case for some of them, hence the private sector participation kept declining. In addition, direct intervention by some actors such as donors and development partners have created overlaps, which, though well-intentioned, lead to a duplication of efforts and tend to undermine agricultural sector coordination.

**The JSR meeting:** Kenya had conducted two JSRs, the first in 2006 (DA 2006) and the second in 2010 (Lundgren 2011), both under the Maputo Declaration. More recently, in 2015, the country has undergone its first JSR assessment since its commitment to the CAADP Compact in 2010 and the implementation of the country's ASDS. The second JSR assessment was carried out in 2017 with the support of a national expert, IFPRI, Africa Lead II and ReSAKSS-ECA. However, since the assessment, a comprehensive JSR has not been carried out in Kenya. One of the major reasons cited for the failure to conduct JSRs was the need for a revision of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS 2010-2020) after the reorganization of the governance system in 2013. Consultations held with Ministry of Agriculture officials indicate that the sector is now ready to conduct a comprehensive JSR after the adoption of a new Agricultural Sector Transformation and Growth Strategy (ASTGS) and its national investment plan (NAIP). It is worth noticing that the Comprehensive JSR must consider the county sides attachments as per the new Constitution of 2010. Both the ASTGS and NAIP have no apparent link to the regional JSR, but there is an EAC-CAADP results framework, which provides an avenue for reporting. After all, it should be noted that there are several JSR-like processes ongoing in the country that have been reviewed in the country's JSR 2017.

There is a country CAADP team of 35 people composed of public and private sector, NGOs, NSA, DP, an inclusive team which will provide the necessary data to report on indicators. Furthermore, Kenya's situation with respect to CAADP coordination is unique; the CAADP focal point now in place is new and will need to be strengthened, and sector coordination mechanisms will need to be resuscitated. In any case, Kenya's JSR needs improvement in terms of coordination, inclusion, policy development, and participation of women and youth for a better rural life.

The first JSR was organized in 2017 in the context of Malabo and tried to inform all the 13 JSR building block indicators. A new NAIP was developed in 2018 and a new JSR held in 2019, though the report not yet available. Before Malabo, two JSR were organized, but unfortunately, there is no report until to-date.

**Non-state actors played key role in the JSR during the meeting.** The formulation of the second NAIP fully involved all non-state actors as members of the commission working groups, including monitoring and evaluation. Also, females and youth were well-represented in the JSR in Kenya. There was a strong advocacy on this matter, such that in all activities there was at least 30% women.

**The preparation of the JSR Meeting:** Several preparation meetings, data collection, data validation, the validation with a larger participation led to new needs and new indicators. With the report from the validation, the CAADP team assessed itself to understand what did not work and how it could be improved. For 2019, more indicators were added and the collection of information spreads from the different Institutions and Ministries was tough.

### 3.7.3. The effect of the JSR on the quality of the BR of Kenya

The JSR of 2017 helped to improve the quality of the first BR of Kenya. In 2017, Kenya was on track. However, it has become extremely difficult to get data from the Institution in charge of Statistics. Tasks were given to lower staff to provide the necessary data. To overcome the difficulties related to data collection for the BR, Kenya emphasized on setting up a Monitoring and Evaluation system.

Hence, the BR in Kenya is not an ad hoc process. It is derived from a permanent M&E system and a permanent multisectoral work given that the impacts of agriculture on other sectors is assessed. Even though Kenya is more focused on monitoring and evaluation, it was not on track for the 2019-2020 BR, though it improved as indicated by the score of 5.1. The lack of monitoring and evaluation for some indicators and the subsequent lack of annual reports were the reasons for the poor score.

The BR requires more time to collect data and prepare the report. Sometimes data sources are expanded, thereby making data collection difficult. There is a need to simplify and give more time to data collection. Kenya was not ready and while trying to focus on the 2017 indicators, new indicators were added. A BR committee from the CAADP team is responsible for permanent data collection.

### 3.7.4. The difficulties of Kenya for appropriate data for the BR

The language of some indicators is not clear or not adapted to the Kenyan context. For example, talking about trading of goods and services to address some indicators, data about import/export in and out of Africa is required. Kenya has data on import/export from all directions, which is not limited to Africa. So, it is difficult to separate in Africa and out of Africa in the Kenyan context. To address the BR indicators, Kenya needs some time to internalize the process to be able to provide relevant data in the future.

In 2017, the process was funded by Development Partners and the Ministry. In 2019 it was only funded by the Development Partners because the Ministry had no funds. There is no support from the regional level for the JSR and BR processes. As the processes are consultative, support is expected in terms of finance and capacity building. ReSAKSS alone supports training (funding the activities) on indicators, finances training workshop and data editing, provides correction, and looks at data before submission to the EAC. Another support is from university research centers like ILRI. Even though there is an increase in the participation of non-state actors, there is still a lot to do to improve their implication in the process as they still represent less than 7% of participants, with a majority being the public sector (57%) and 28.6% being development partners.

**Table 4: Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review Workshops in Kenya**

Category of Participants	2017	%
Members of parliament and ministers	20	57
Local government (political and technical)		
Staff of Sectoral Ministries and their agencies		
Other ministries and agencies		
Nongovernmental and civil society organizations	2	5.7
Private sector		
Farmers' groups and organizations		
Development partners and International Organizations	10	28.6
Research and training institutions	3	8.6
Total	35	100

Source: Author, 2020.

## IV. THE CASE OF CAMEROON IN CENTRAL AFRICA (ECCAS)

### 4.1. The national policy

Cameroon is a country within the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS). The Government has assigned a major strategic role to the rural or agro-sylvo-pastoral and fisheries sector to accelerate economic growth, combat poverty and create employment. This role is enshrined in the Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS, 2015-2020) and its National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP). The RSDS enables the different ministries in charge of the rural sector such as the ministries in charge of: (i) agriculture and rural development; (ii) livestock, fisheries, and animal industries; (iii) forests and wildlife; and (iv) environment, nature protection and sustainable development, to fit their interventions into the NAIP.

At the regional level, the RSDS-NAIP is aligned with the sub-regional and regional commitments: the CAADP framework and the Regional Program for Agricultural Investment, Food and Nutritional Security (RPAIFNS) which is designed to federate the priorities of the various stakeholders of ECCAS. RPAIFNS combines investments with public policy reforms. It is the first regional instrument for the operationalization of the regional agricultural policy also called 'the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the ECCAS zone. Its aim is to accelerate the modernization and profound transformation of the agricultural sector, livestock production, fisheries, and forestry of ECCAS member States.

### 4.2. The governance, monitoring and evaluation of RSDS/NAIP in Cameroon

The governance, monitoring and evaluation of RSDS/NAIP which plays the role of the Agricultural Joint Sector Review Steering Committee, was established in 2018, and consists of the following bodies:



**The Orientation and Supervision Committee (COS)** which is chaired by the Secretary General of the Prime Minister's Services and is composed of Ministers from 13 ministries as well as the Chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture. Development Partners participate as observers. The main mandate of the COS is the definition of priorities and modalities of the interventions in the rural sector.

**The Technical Committee (TC)**, under the Minister of the Economy, Planning and Regional Development, brings together the General Secretaries of the 13 ministries represented in the COS. The TC makes use of reports and analysis of the recommendations from institutional reviews to propose strategic orientations for the sector to the COS.

**The Technical Secretariat (ST)** is under the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development and is led by a Technical Coordinator (the CAADP/NAIP focal point). Members of the Technical Secretariat are representatives of ministries involved in the sector. The ST facilitates various analyses related to the implementation, as well as the M&E of the RSDS/NAIP. The Technical Secretariat is the head of the JSR processes and Biennial Report.

The implementation of the RSDS/NAIP is a participatory process that brings together the four ministries in charge of the rural sector and other stakeholders like NGOs, FBOs, Development partners, Research institutions, and the Private sector. Local authorities also play an important role in the current context of decentralization, to ensure efficient and effective planning, programming, budgeting, mobilization of finance, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of rural sector development interventions.

#### 4.3. The Joint Sector Review Processes as Implemented in Cameroon

**Preparation of the JSR Report:** Prior to the first JSR ever organized, several consultants were hired to conduct necessary studies for the general report of the RSDS/NAIP. Consultants worked closely with staff from the SC and the TS on several issues such as key results achieved, financial resource use for the period 2015-2018, crafting the strategic orientation of the RSDS and the second generation of NAIP for the period 2020-2027. The key ministries also prepared their performance reports.

Data was collected from the National Institute of Statistics, the preliminary reports of the on-going National Agriculture and Livestock Census. Data was also collected from stakeholders, parastatal companies, ministries, private sector and FBOs, and analyzed with the support of consultants, to contribute to the draft of the JSR Report. Contributions were also sought from the Technical Working Group on the Harmonized Framework (CH) for analysis and monitoring of household vulnerability. This is a JSR-like initiative, coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture and composed of a Technical Secretariat, a Technical Working Group, and an Analysis Unit. The analysis unit is composed of multi-stakeholders (Government, DP, NGOs) and is facilitated by technical Institutions such as CILLS and WFP.

**The draft Terms of Reference (ToR)** for the JSR was proposed by the Technical Committee to the various constituents of the rural sector for inputs. The MINEPAT provided the necessary financial resources that covered all the budget lines of the JSR meeting (transport of participants, feeding, communication, renting the meeting rooms, publishing the JSR Report...). Members of the TS were called to proposed participants to assure the full involvement of the key stakeholders including the private sector and farmers organizations in the process.

**The JSR Meeting:** This was chaired by the Minister Delegate of Agriculture for two (2) days, using various formats (plenary, small groups) that allowed stakeholders to discuss/verify the evidence and recommendations presented in the JSR Report.

**Non-state actors plaid key role in the JSR during the meeting.** Their contribution to the development of policies, strategies and analysis of the Rural Sector was appreciated, mostly on advocacy of the producers' concerns and their resolutions. However, there was a limited participation of women and youth.

#### 4.4. JSR resolutions concerned

**The timing of the event:** to include issues that need further actions in the agriculture sector budget. The JSR must be organized ahead of the country's annual session of the budget. JSR recommendations can and should be able to impact the country's budget process. Indeed, to improve the process, proper scheduling for the JSR is an important element to be considered to influence budgetary orientation. Further recommendations were:

- ▶ Adopting the JSR report, and strategically orientating the RSDS and the second generation of NAIP for the period 2020-2027;
- ▶ Strengthening the participation of civil society, which is not limited to the private sector or Farmers Organizations, but should also include all the national representation of the Senate and the Parliament;
- ▶ Paying more attention to the interests of women and youth, which would then be incorporated into the future JSR. These key actors will only participate if their interests are integrated into the agricultural policy;
- ▶ Supporting the creation and reform of inter-professional organizations to better represent the constituencies, including importers and exporters, to bring together all the actors of the value chains;
- ▶ Building a strong monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure that the recommendations of the JSR are carefully considered and implemented. To this end, a computerized database is in the process of being operationalized to keep track of key indicators and the Biennial Review Report.

**Communication of results of the JSR:** The JSR report was edited and translated in both English and French and shared to all key stakeholders in the electronic or paper form. It is an additional mechanism that could support the exercise of JSR and BR in the pursuit of mutual accountability.

#### 4.5. Key issues that need further attention

A **Decentralized JSR** would bring a better implication of stakeholders at the local level. The regionalization of the NAIP in the actual context of decentralization will significantly impact the performance of the process. In the future, therefore, regional RSCs will be needed to feed the national JSR.

Mobilization of resources is needed to hold regional reviews between April and May to be able to feed the national JSR in June. We can also solicit partners who are continually active in regions such as GIZ. This will facilitate ownership by stakeholders and improve the quality of data provided to feed the national review.

Better coordination and alignment of the Development Partners' interventions in the country.

Ownership of the Malabo commitments and the CAADP/NAIP process by the Government which should be reflected through participation of events and communication of the frameworks.

**The impact of the JSR on the BR:** The first ever JSR organized in Cameroon has tremendously helped to improve the BR Report, as evidenced by the score which went from 2.1 in 2017 to 4.2 in 2019. However, members of the civil society believe that the BR indicators are difficult to measure and require a certain capacity. The BR is like an assessment of the capacity of countries to provide information for the indicators, instead of measuring the actual performance of the country against the Malabo targets. Also, efforts needed to measure some indicators were disproportionate to the national statistical capacity. Countries with good capacities in agricultural statistics are therefore the best in terms of scores.

Harmonization of the JSR and BR timetables is needed. Indeed, organizing JSR activities in advance, including virtual platforms, would better align JSR with the exercise of preparing the Biennial Report (BR). For the biennial review to be more than just an ad hoc exercise and for an effective monitoring, the same platform should be used for both exercises to ensure continuity. The process needs more considerations from the sectorial ministries and involvement of people's representatives. A smart planning of JSR, with respect to the national budgetary calendar would enhance its consideration in the rural sector national budget.

When complete, the General Census of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry (GCALF) of Cameroon will provide an appreciable amount of quality data which would be used as a concrete reference situation for the national rural sector. Some of the data that seemed difficult or costly to measure when preparing the JSR or BR will be made available from the Census. When the JSR will be organized regularly, getting quality data to inform the BR report will be much easier.

**Table 5: Category of Participants at Recent Joint Sector Review Workshop in Cameroon**

Category of Participants	2019	%
Members of parliament and ministers	4	4.94
Local government (political and technical)	3	3.70
Staff of Sectorial Ministries and their agencies	26	32.10
Other ministries and agencies	8	9.90
Nongovernmental and civil society organizations	6	7.40
Private sector	3	3.70
Farmers' groups and organizations	5	6.17
Media	9	11.11
Development partners	12	14.81
Research and training institutions	5	6.17
Women	25	30,1
Total	81	100

Source: Authors, 2020.

## V. OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES IN THE JSR IMPLEMENTATION

### 5.1. Missing links in the current JSR processes

Discussions with various stakeholders and desk reviews indicate several gaps and missing links in the JSR processes. Among these are: bureaucracy, institutional anchoring, capacity of NSA, funding the JSR processes, appropriation of the JSR by countries and RECS, just to name the few.

#### 5.1.1. Poor consultation process of NSA

NSAs involvement in policy and program formulation is informal and is largely limited to ad hoc invitations to attend stakeholder consultative meetings. Often the NSAs are represented by apex bodies at the national or regional levels. These bodies may not have the required resources to allocate for the consultations. They often have no time to undertake their own internal consultations with their constituents. Another limitation of the consultations is the tendency to focus on development of policies and programs and their adoption/ratification by partner states. Less effort is devoted to the implementation and progress review. NSAs end up having little to no say; they just agree on a predictable agenda which is prepared in advance.

#### 5.1.2. Condescending attitude of bureaucracy is a real drawback during the JSR

In some countries, public servants monopolize the entire JSR processes. They control the agenda of the JSR, they outnumber other stakeholder groups, while some have condescending attitudes towards NSA. They keep the floor and may not pay enough attention when NSAs are speaking. Such top-down attitude does not facilitate the dialogue among participants at the JSR.

#### 5.1.3. Feeling of exclusion from the implementation of NAIP and RAIP by NSA

NSAs feel that they are called in only for the preparation of the NAIP but are sidelined when activities are funded. Fingers have been pointed at the RECs. They prefer to launch competitive calls that only international NGOs can win to implement most activities funded by foreign donors. At the end, local NGOs and FBOs are excluded from the competition, as they do not have similar experience and capacities. In such situations, it is the responsibility of the countries and RECs to build the capacities of local NSA and give them a chance, by having not to put all activities on competitive calls but have 30 to 40% as commissioned calls dedicated to them. Such approach would improve capacities and allow local NSA to take ownership of the NAIPs and RAIPs. This would help build their capacities, and increase their sense of responsibility, commitment, and accountability in the CAADP processes. Their management skills and their governance capacities will also be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of NAIPs and RAIPs.

#### 5.1.4. Insufficient involvement of NSA throughout the JSR process

Indeed, during the consultations in preparation for the JSR process, non-state actors participated. However, they are usually not aware of what happens next and are therefore sidelined once funds are mobilized and throughout the implementation. They therefore complain of not being considered in the management of funds, which explains

the low interest and low participation of women's associations, young people, and the private sector in the JSRs. The success of the process depends on ownership by local actors. Therefore, they should not only be prompted for project formulation, but should be part of the implementation so that they can feel involved in the process. participate effectively. They should therefore be part of the negotiations for external financing. The crucial question arising is how to rethink the political dialogue in the implementation phase? In addition, the responsibility of the national entity in charge of coordinating the NAIP should be reviewed. Likewise, the sub-sectoral ministries make projects for their policy and no longer want to refer to the NAIP.

#### 5.1.5. Insufficient resourcing of JSR

The lack of sufficient resources in RECs and countries among others, limits the operationalization of the JSR. Few JSR are organized because of a lack of resources, hence there is no way to follow a timely JSR schedule. If a development partner comes up with the funds right away, then a JSR can hold. Some countries expect funds from donor agencies before planning their JSR. Only Rwanda has been able to domesticate its funds, taking it seriously, and carrying JSR twice a year.

Combined with the structuration of the sector from the national to the grassroots level, which reduces the participation of the private sector, the sustainability of the JSR is not guaranteed. Leaders at the grassroots could mobilize other actors on the agriculture agenda but still funding of the process will be a major issue.

#### 5.1.6. Lack of interest and commitment by the leadership of the various stakeholders

Lack of interest and commitment by the leadership of the various stakeholders that they coordinate. Initially, especially if there is strong political support from the President or Prime Minister, the various ministries and organizations are represented at the highest level of ministers, permanent secretaries, or directors. Over time, the level of representation reduces to junior staff who cannot make decisions or commitments on behalf of their ministries or organizations. This hampers the pace of program implementation. There is also a tendency for ministries to revert to their traditional mandates and pay little or no attention to priorities arising from the JSRs.

#### 5.1.7. Unclear mandate of the JSR coordination platforms

The mandate of the platform: since multi-sectoral coordination platforms are not statutory bodies, decisions made in their meetings are not binding on the respective ministries, agencies, and departments. No mechanism exists to enforce resource allocation to priorities arising out of the planning meetings, JSRs or steering committee of the coordination mechanism.

#### 5.1.8. Communication approach on NAIPs, RAIPs and the JSR

The lack of an appropriate platform allowing the expression and participation of the private sector in the dialogues; the PNIA is supposed to be a unifying framework. The challenge of finding the best possible anchorage remains. In some countries, the national entity in charge of implementing NAIPs is the bottleneck of the JSR process. Similarly, all countries are not at the same level of the process and the instances are not powerful enough. It is sometimes housed

within Ministries and does not give the opportunity to non-state actors to express themselves, to participate in funding negotiations, as well as in the implementation of projects.

## **5.2. Progress towards improving the JSR practices in pursuit of the accountability**

### **5.2.1. A multi-sectoral coordination-led agricultural transformation**

The excellent example of Rwanda has shown that multisectoral coordination allows joint planning and coordinated implementation, minimizes duplication of activities, and therefore brings about efficiency in the utilization of scarce public resources. For any activity, the performances of different stakeholders can be improved by establishing multi-sector coordination platforms at local and at national levels to support the implementation of a national agricultural investment plan (NAIP). These platforms specify the activities to be implemented by various agencies in line with their respective mandates. Furthermore, NAIPs have annual milestones for each activity against which performance of the ministries and agencies is measured. By establishing a formal JSR platform to review progress in the implementation of NAIPs on a regular, these countries can make informed choices of priorities for the following financial year. At the ministerial level, these platforms allow for information exchange about the plans of the cooperating ministries to create synergy and minimize duplication and wastage of public resources.

### **5.2.2. NSA and Gender inclusion in the implementation platforms of NAIPs and RAIPs**

For the non-state actors, the platforms create space for them to voice out concerns about implementation of NAIPs or call for policy or regulatory reforms to create a conducive environment for private sector investment in agriculture. The platform also gives room to consider gender-related issues and the implication of youth in the implementation of NAIP.

### **5.2.3. Putting more emphasis on capacity building of NSA and bringing in the private sector**

Agricultural transformation requires public and private investments both within and out of agriculture. Public investments in agriculture include: (i) agricultural research to generate the technologies that are needed to boost productivity; (ii) agricultural extension services to provide advisory services to farmers; (iii) policies and strategies to guide sector planning and investments; and (iv) agricultural transformation by strengthening institutional and human capacity.

Governments must deliberately nurture and encourage development of an entrepreneurial class that can operate in a competitive environment, either on the domestic or regional and international levels. As the Rwanda example has shown, calls for greater involvement of the private sector easily underestimate the small size and relative inexperience of private sector players across the continent, attributes that render the private sector unable to play important roles in the pursuit of agricultural transformation.

### **5.2.4. Funding the Secretariat in charge of the JSR preparation**

All the countries and RECs are struggling with the funding issue. A solution may arise from a real ownership by the NSA. From consultations, it is clear that FBOs can live without always relying on external funding for their sustainability.

Nationals and the government can fund the process. Ownership is a key element to the efficient utilization of resources, funding, and well-adapted techniques. This can only be done through capacity building of NSA. There is no fund for the biennial review report. In Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, the allocation of resources to agriculture compared to other small-scale participating bodies is low. It becomes so difficult to adopt and integrate the process.

### 5.3. The uniqueness of the JSR for mutual accountability

#### 5.3.1. Inclusiveness in the JSR process

For a better engagement of non-state actors and private sector into the JSR process at the starting point, their role in the development of the agricultural sector should be clarified and the objectives of the implication of each group should be well-defined. Their role and objectives should later be articulated from policy to strategy to plan, in the context of CAADP.

Therefore, at the planning level, it should be clear who will do what and where. This means a clear role in the NAIP, clear objectives in the NAIP, the private sector will willingly be able to invest in the value chains opportunity. The public sector is committed to policy and the private sector should commit to putting money if their role is cleared and they should be encouraged to that. Objectives of the commitment can be growth or food security. After clearing the objectives of each group of actors, the NAIP will be put in place, with the cooperation agreement between all parties. A good monitoring and evaluation system would then be set to monitor progress and performance of each partner's progress in achieving their commitment. The data from the monitoring and evaluation will then ease the JSR.

Private sector will not waste time or do charity. The JSR would help the private sector to identify opportunities for their medium- and long-term objectives, which would thereby help them make profit. Also, there should be mutual trust and understanding of the private sector, if involved from the planning, with the public sector. They will be able to invest. The same is true with the NGO. They can come together on agreed objectives with the other key actors.

Therefore, the uniqueness of the actual JSR process is its inclusiveness. All the stakeholders (state, private sector, and non-state actors (CSOs, FBOs, development partners) are more implicated now whereas the previous ones involved a limited number of stakeholders, for instance the government and a development partner.



### 5.3.2. The JSR is part of the implementation of the CAADP processes

A great mistake which those countries make is to take the JSR in isolation instead of being part of the agreement from the planning phase. So how can an actor who was not involved in the planning be part of the assessment when he had no commitment to the process? Sometime even though an actor signed the compact, they are excluded during the implementation. This made them not to be accountable for anything anymore. The platform is to share performance and challenges to get suggestions on how these challenges could be handled. Also, another actor's commitment may affect other ones, and these could be alleviated during discussions. Challenges for the private sector may be related to: (i) Policy reform from the government; (ii) Funding; and (iii) Business environment.

A JSR should be country-owned, of relevance to the sectoral common agenda, be inclusive of all relevant parties who are expected to be affected, impartial, enhance national planning, be sensitive to gender, and be capable of generating a learning experience that further favors the whole MA process in the sector (CAADP MA-M&E JAG, 2012). In this way, JSRs allow diverse stakeholders to get insights into and influence overall policies and priorities of the sector.

### 5.4. Some procedural and substantive elements are needed for an acceptable JSR

The procedural elements relate to the requirements for an acceptable JSR for the purpose of achieving the CAADP and Malabo commitments, such as the existence of a sector-wide platform in which the JSR takes place. Substantive elements encapsulate the material aspects of the JSR, such as the content, methods, coverage, and depth of the review among others (CAADP MA-M&E JAG, 2012).

From the JSR guidelines (CAADP MA-M&E JAG, 2012), a typical JSR takes place within a sector-wide platform for review. In general, the conduct starts with a joint sector review committee (JSRC) charged with the task of conducting the JSR. The JSRC then utilizes the structures of the review platform to develop and share terms of reference with the various stakeholders in the sector, including the experts chosen to carry out studies relevant to the JSR. The review team assesses data demands to answer the questions raised in the terms of reference for the JSR considering the existing quality data and analytical capacities available to the sector (CAADP MA-M&E JAG, 2012). Where capacities are insufficient, decisions are made on how to fill the gaps. Thereafter the team conducts the studies or analysis and proceeds to preparing the JSR reports that are discussed by the JSRC and other technical personnel before they are shared with senior sectoral managers for their opinion and review. Once the reports are cleared at this level, they are then presented at a JSR meeting of the stakeholders, most of whom have representatives who are members of the JSRC.

The final JSR meeting is typically referred to as a validation meeting. It popularizes sectoral findings and seeks comments that become part of the final report. The sector then drafts sectoral action plans.

### 5.5. The effect of the JSR on the Biennial Report (BR) performance of selected countries

#### 5.5.1. The BR: a benchmarking method to evaluate progress against targets

According to major stakeholders, the biennial review is a cumbersome process with an infinite number of indicators.



The JSR is a good tool, more realistic and concrete than the BR, which allows states to correct themselves and readjust themselves in the implementation of the process. Although it provides information at the state level, this very ambitious tool with its 47 indicators seems fictitious. We should have analytical grids to evaluate the development of each country and compare with other countries. In addition, this plethora of indicators poses a problem of data to feed the indicators in certain countries and could push them to falsify or present figures which do not reflect the reality on the ground to maintain a good rating. It would be better to set a minimum number of achievable indicators by states and perhaps add other indicators gradually as countries gain experience, which would make it possible to measure and assess the effort of countries in the process.

The BR process, report, and AATS have emphasized the importance of having adequate and high-quality data to support evidence-based analysis and decision making, reliably assess progress, and effectively identify and address bottlenecks to accelerate progress toward meeting the Malabo commitments. More specifically the process highlighted the following key challenges:

- ▶ Weak country data and M&E systems and capacities, including: (i) poor data quality and unavailability of data in required formats; (ii) poor data sharing protocols across ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) that have a bearing on agriculture, food security, nutrition, and rural development; (iii) weak technical capacities for data collection, M&E, and analysis;
- ▶ Narrow stakeholder platforms for review and dialogue which is not inclusive of all key stakeholder groups especially CSOs and FBOs;
- ▶ Lack of champions and political commitment in public and private institutions as well as limited awareness about the BR process in some countries;
- ▶ Limitations associated with the performance scorecard methodology, including the: (i) use of equal weights across all the indicators, which vary in the degree of difficulty to implement, (ii) bias of the BR scores in favor of the commitments that are least difficult to implement, (iii) issue of assigning a zero-score for lack of data for reporting countries, which can bias the results, but can also lead to a loss of interest to report low performance.

### Box 3: A summary of the viewpoints made by some stakeholders

Discussions with stakeholders indicate that the biennial review is a cumbersome process with an infinite number of indicators. They argue that JSR is more realistic and concrete than the BR, which is a good tool allowing States to correct and readjust the implementation of their NAIPs. Although it provides information at the State level, this very ambitious tool with its 49 indicators seems ‘fictitious’. In addition, the plethora of indicators poses a problem of necessary data to feed them in certain countries and could push them to falsify or present figures which do not reflect the reality on the ground, to maintain a good rating. It would be better to set a minimum number of achievable indicators by states and perhaps add other indicators gradually as countries gain experience, which would make it possible to measure and assess the effort of countries in the process.

#### 5.5.2. Progress made by individual countries since 2017

As the results show, progress in the underlying indicators is dominated by submission of a country’s BR report. Because the higher-level scores (C-scores and T-scores) are based on equal weighting of the performance at the immediate lower levels, submission of a country’s BR report also dominates the C-scores and the T-scores. Submitting a BR report gets you a third of the way to being assessed as being on track to meeting the MA commitment.

Table 6: overall progress for implementing the Malabo Declaration

Countries	Scores	Scores	% Progress
	2017	2019	
Senegal	3.8	5.18	36
Nigeria	3.4	5.18	52
Rwanda	6.1	7.24	19
Kenya	4.8	4.88	2
Cameroon	2.1	4.21	100

**Source:** The authors

From table 6 above, it is clear that Rwanda is the model country in implementing the Malabo Declaration. But the most noticeable feature is the 100% progress made by Cameroon from 2017 to 2019. This is explained by the fact that in 2019, the country held its first biennial review. Furthermore, the ongoing *“Recensement General de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage”* contributed to the high improvement of the country’s capacity for reporting. In the meantime, Kenya’s progress is stable as shown by the low results (2%). This reflects the country’s weak data collection system, the need for the internalization of the JSR, the need for the adaptation of indicators to fit the country’s context. For example, for goods and services trade data, Kenya is just reporting on import and export irrespective of it being in or out of Africa as requested in the BR indicators.

### 5.5.3. Difficulties in data collection for JSR and BR can be overcome

Once complete, the on-going General Census of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry (GCALF) will provide appreciable amount of quality data that would be used as a concrete reference situation for the national rural sector. Some of the data that seemed difficult or costly to measure during the JSR or BR will be made available from the Census. When the JSR will be organized regularly, getting quality data to inform the BR report will be much easier.

It is a commendable effort by the AUDA-NEPAD to put agriculture on top of the agenda of the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government. It is critical for the stakeholders to seize such an opportunity to present the performance achieved by countries to the top policy makers, to request the necessary means to fill in the gaps to accelerate the transformation of African agriculture.

The issue now is how to keep improving the BR reporting mechanisms to keep the momentum and the attention of the of Heads of States and Government, and eventually development partners in the evidence-based planning and implementation of the NAIPs.

## VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1. Conclusions

The synthesis of findings on the Joint Sector Review processes in selected countries and RECs indicates that they are all committed to align the development, implementation, and review of their agricultural and food security policies, plans and strategies with the principles and framework of the CAADP. They all have set up the processes of establishing a comprehensive agriculture Joint Sector Review mechanism, but at various degrees of success and achievement.

The JSR process gathered enough momentum during the year 2016 to come up with the biennial reporting tools and instruments, as well as the coordination mechanism.

Several countries in Africa do carry an annual evaluation of the implementation of their National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs). Although the path to policy formulation, implementation, and review is often country-specific among countries that are engaged in the CAADP, considerable changes have been observed. The inclusive, participatory, transparent, and evidence-based policy making process is becoming more widely used in the joint sector review (JSR) assessment exercise. The outcomes of such an annual performance review are meant to provide information for prioritized interventions for the following financial year and are captured in the ministerial budget framework papers for the following financial year. Regular sector reviews involving all the stakeholders are important for ensuring mutual accountability among the various stakeholders towards the milestones and targets in the NAIP. These platforms allow for an exchange of information about the plans of the cooperating ministries to create synergy and minimize duplication and wastage of public resources. For the non-state actors, the platforms create space for them to voice out their concerns about the implementation of NAIPs or call for policy or regulatory reforms to create a conducive environment for private sector investment in agriculture. The lessons learned so far have indicated the following gaps in the JSR processes:

- ▶ Limited role of the private sector: The role of the private sector is indispensable for the realization of the envisaged transformation of the economy, particularly that of the agricultural sector. However, the private sector does not play a significant role in either the policy and program development, or the implementation review processes. In some cases, the private sector may be consulted for the development of new policies, but there is no existing mechanism that regularly supports or includes the private-sector participation in these processes.
- ▶ Limited participation of non-state actors: currently there is no significant engagement of non-state actors in the implementation and review of the Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment, partly because of their poor organizational structure.
- ▶ Lack of participation of women and youth: as with nonstate actors, there is no evidence that women and youth interests are currently incorporated in the Agricultural Sector Policy and other agricultural sector programs and processes.
- ▶ Unclear mechanism for follow-up: the mechanism for following up on recommendations from the reviews needs to be strengthened.

For ownership by African countries and RECs, the JSR processes will also have to address the following crucial issues: (i) The prerequisites required to scale up the JSR experience for countries and RECs that are willing to embrace the processes; (ii) How the JSR can help to strengthen/foster multi-sectorial coordination in order to propel the implementation of the NAIP/RAIP; (iii) The most appropriate stakeholder mapping in a typical JSR process and how this platform is connected to the Biennial Report process in the countries and RECs.

The JSR serves as a means for operationalizing the concept of the mutual accountability framework (MAF). The agricultural JSR, which is a mechanism for operationalizing the CAADP involves stakeholders in the sector who hold each other accountable for delivery on objectives that they jointly developed and use yardsticks on which they jointly agreed. JSRs create a platform to: (i) assess the performance and results of the agricultural sector; (ii) assist governments in setting sector policy and priorities; and (iii) assess how well the Government and NSAs have implemented pledges and commitments as laid out in NAIPs, programs, projects, and other agreements. JSRs also facilitate information sharing and consensus building among different stakeholders in a sector.

The JSRs are becoming more inclusive, impartial, evidence-based, and results-oriented, and the scope of work is expanding, all of which are to the benefit of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, JSR practices have improved the attitude toward accountability and governance of resources within the sector. It is like a non-written contract between participants such as the Government, FBOs, CSOs, Development partners and the private sector. However, it has not yet reach desired levels.

The major missing links in the current JSR processes identified include: (i) Poor consultation process of NSA; (ii) Condescending attitude of bureaucracy is a real drawback during the JSR; (iii) Feeling of exclusion from the implementation of NAIP and RAIP by NSA; (iv) Lack of sufficient resources for JSR; (v) Lack of interest and commitment by the leadership of the various stakeholders; (vi) Unclear mandate of the of the JSR coordination platforms; (vii) Inefficient communication channel for NAIPs and the JSR; and (viii) Inefficient communication channel for NAIPs and the JSR.

It seems that the absence of a binding contract among stakeholders, limits adherence to agreed actions. There is no legally enforceable agreement, rather mutual confidence among partners which is mainly based on the understanding that a party will feel morally bound to adhere to the agreement. In some cases, the parties may feel duty bound to act in accordance with the MA framework or may do so out of the fear of humiliation by compliant parties, CSOs, or politicians. This is a weaker incentive for performance compared to one based on rule of law and enforcement.

The JSR processes have helped to build capacities of stakeholder, mostly at the Regional JSR of ECOWAS and Senegal. Through dialogues and meetings, the JSRs have provided a voice to FBOs, CSOs, and the private sector and the likelihood that their voice is heard and put to use. This may be a result of the trust created between the government and other stakeholders through direct interactions. In other countries however, capacity of stakeholder is still weak, thus, deliberate efforts to develop stakeholder capacities may be imperative.

Once introduced, JSRs have improved over time: JSR practices have positively changed, and are improving over time (e.g., in Cameroon, Nigeria and Senegal). Changes have occurred in terms of inclusivity of various stakeholders over time, as well as the BR notation. Conducting JSRs have helped the development of M&E and the need for better

data than before in most countries. Taking tangible steps to strengthen data and M&E systems is critical as stated for Senegal and Kenya.

## 6.2. Necessity to review tools and instruments, coordination mechanism for JSR and BR

The uniqueness of the CAADP Joint Sector Review and Biennial Review is that they have now triggered awareness and mutual accountability in agriculture at several platforms in countries, RECs, and the Africa Union. Data availability is one of the key success factors in these processes. Therefore, there is a greater need to build capacity of actors and institutions for the appropriation of these processes, mostly on the production of quality data. Furthermore, there is a need to review tools and instruments, as well as the coordination mechanism and roadmap for the JSR and BR. Jumping from countries to the continental level does not allow appropriate learning among countries, which, most of the time have very little in common. The initial learning and comparison should be made at the level of the RECs. Greater attention is paid on strengthening and harmonizing agricultural policies at the level of ECOWAP. Biennial reports should then be submitted to the Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS, before moving to the level of the AU Assembly. The JSR and BR are more proactive in designing required actions through the NAIP to close identified performance gaps. The important questions to be addressed by a country should not necessarily be the score at the BR, but whether it is on track regarding the Malabo commitments, and finally, if it is in the right growth path to close the identified gaps.

## 6.3. Recommendations: the most essential steps to take the JSR experience to scale

From the synthesis of findings on the JSR processes, the following recommendations must be implemented by RECs, countries, and AUC-NEPAD/CAADP to scale up the JSR and BR processes:

### 6.3.1. Recommendation to the RECS:

- (i) Establish a predictable regional JSR calendar;
- (ii) Ensure that adequate human and financial resources are mobilized for the regional JSR process;
- (iii) Invest in mobilizing political, technical, and financial support for the implementation of agriculture and food security policies and programs including the regional JSR;
- (iv) Facilitate appropriation of best practices by countries in the JSR and BR towards achieving the Malabo commitments;
- (v) Dedicate 40% of commissioned projects for implementation by local NSA when necessary;
- (vi) Entrench a culture of using evidence in policy and decision-making processes.

### 6.3.2. Recommendations to the countries

- (i) Improve participation of the Private sector, NGO, FBO, Gender and Youth in the NAIP implementation for accountability and quality of the JSR processes;
- (ii) Implement the necessary further policy and institutional reforms in the JSR and BR processes in the context of the global pandemics of COVID-19, and use of new information and communication technology to keep the momentum;
- (iii) Strengthen institutional and human capacity in data collection and analysis for the JSR and BR report;

- (iv) Set up appropriate mechanisms for a sustainable funding of the NAIP, JSR and its mutual accountability framework;
- (v) Set up appropriate mechanisms for following up on the decisions and recommendations arising from JSR and involve NSA in M&E and dialogue framework, even out of JSR meetings to meet up with Malabo commitments;
- (vi) Institute 2 annual JSRs as in Rwanda, and follow up that action points and gaps are considered in the budget planning of sector ministries;
- (vii) Strengthen intersectoral coordination and establish innovative platforms for sharing data across ministries, departments, and agencies;
- (viii) Strengthen the communication channels between sector ministries.
- (ix) For countries which have the National Institute of Statistics that produce quality data on social, economic, environment, trade. They should be part of the Technical Secretariat of the NAIP, to provide the necessary data; and for those indicators that have not been measured so far, to start working on them;
- (x) Organize and carry the National Census of Agriculture: Country-level monitoring of the progress towards the Malabo commitment, and other needs such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that have become an important element in formulating economic development strategies, and countries that have begun focusing on the need for these indicators as a key component of the national statistical program. A census of agriculture is one of the largest national statistical collections undertaken by a country, and its data for monitoring the Malabo commitments and MDGs should be taken seriously into consideration;
- (xi) Governments should be proactive and continue to take the lead. It is not surprising that the JSRs are more advanced with a more proactive government. Leadership of the agricultural sector and its processes is within the exclusive competence of government. Governments should take JSRs seriously and must lead them, which entails using their own financing.

### 6.3.3. Recommendations to AUC-NEPAD/CAADP

Strengthening mutual accountability for the next BR will require the need to urgently address the challenges by:

- (i) Strengthening the agriculture JSRs which are the bedrocks for an inclusive and comprehensive BR process and make them an integral part of the BR process. Initiation of the process early to ensure that countries and RECs have adequate time to execute all key steps of the BR roadmap;
- (ii) Improving capacities in countries for data collection and quality, M&E, and analysis systems;
- (iii) Facilitating access to country knowledge networks such as country Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) platforms where they exist to support data collection and analysis efforts;
- (iv) Promoting country ownership of the BR process including countries that have dedicated budget lines to finance the BR process;
- (v) Broadening the role of NSA in the BR process and increasing awareness of its importance among all stakeholders.



## VII. REFERENCES

1. AGRA. (2018). Africa Agriculture Status Report: Catalyzing Government Capacity to Drive Agricultural Transformation (Issue 6). Nairobi, Kenya: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). ISSN: 2313-5387.
2. ASDS, 2010. Medium Term Investment Plan 2010–2015. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Agriculture.
3. AU (African Union). 2003. Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security. Declarations. Assembly/AU/Decl.4-11 (II). Assembly of the African Union, Second Ordinary Session, July 10–12. Maputo, Mozambique.
4. AU, 2017. Rapport d'étape 2017 à la Conférence: Accent sur le commerce intra-africain des produits agricoles et des services connexes: risques et opportunités, 140p.
5. CAADP Joint Action Group on Mutual Accountability and Monitoring and Evaluation (CAADP MA-M&E JAG). (2012). Guidelines to Undertaking Agriculture Joint Sector Reviews. Midrand, South Africa: NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency.
6. CAADP Results Framework 2015–2025. Midland, South Africa: NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency.
7. Cameroon, 2018: Monitoring the Implementation of the Rural Sector Development Strategy, Annual Report 2018, 75p
8. Clarke, M. (1996). The problem of time inconsistency. Essay. Retrieved from [https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/assets/pdf/SER/1996/Myles\\_H\\_Clarke.html](https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/assets/pdf/SER/1996/Myles_H_Clarke.html).
9. DA (Development Associates A/S). 2006. Strategy for Revitalization of Agriculture, The Way Forward. Findings of the Joint Review. Final Report. Nairobi, Kenya.
10. East African Community (EAC), 2015. EAC Vision 2050: Regional Vision for the Socio-Economic Transformation and Development. EAC Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania.
11. East African Community Region, An assessment of the Regional Agriculture Joint Sector Review Process, 2019 report.101p.
12. ECOWAP/CAADP process 2025: 2017; RAIP-FNS 2016-20 Regional Agriculture Investment Plan and Food Security and Nutrition, 128p.
13. Ethiopia, Joint Sector Review Assessment, 2014: Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive, Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue, 77p.
14. Ghana Joint Sector Review Assessment; 2014: Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive, Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue, 70p.



15. GoK (Republic of Kenya). 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003–2007 (ERS). Nairobi, Kenya.
16. Kenya Agriculture joint sector review assessment, 2017. Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive, Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue, 117p.
17. Lundgren, Bjorn. 2011. Joint Agricultural Sector Review, Final Report. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Agriculture.
18. Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods. Decisions, Declarations and Resolution. Assembly/AU/Decl. 1–4(XXIII). Assembly of the African Union, Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, June 26–27, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.
19. MINAGRI. 2018. “Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources.” Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources. 2018. <http://www.minagri.gov.rw>.
20. MINECOFIN. 2018. “Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.” Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 2018. <http://www.minecofin.gov.rw>.
21. Nigeria Agriculture Sector Performance Review: A background report for the Nigeria 2017 agriculture joint sector review august, 2018. 80p.
22. Rapport des travaux des Experts sur le bilan et les perspectives de l’ECOWAP 2025 (Conakry, Guinée, 2-4 December 2019), 48p.
23. Report of the workshop on Nigeria agriculture joint sector review, Abuja, 28th – 29th September 2017. 57p.
24. Republic of Kenya. (2008). Sector Plan for Agriculture First Medium-Term Plan (2008–2012). Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries.
25. Republic of Kenya. (2013). Sector Plan for Agriculture Second Medium Term Plan (2013–2017). Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries.
26. Republic of Rwanda. (2017). Assessment of the impact of decentralization policy implementation in Rwanda (2001–2017). Kigali, Rwanda: Ministry of Local Government.
27. Royal Danish Embassy/DANIDA. (2010). Lessons Learned Report: Kenya Agricultural Sector Program Support. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.
28. Rwanda, Joint Sector Review 2020/2021 Forward Looking Agricultural Sector, June 23, 2020. 28 Ppt.
29. Sénégal, Evaluation des processus de revue conjointe du secteur agricole, 2014: Promouvoir la responsabilité mutuelle par des processus de revue et de dialogue complets, inclusifs et techniquement robustes, 113p.

30. Sénégal, Revue Conjointe du Secteur Agricole Et Validation du PNIASAN, 2018. Rapport final, December 2018. 34p.
31. Tanzania, Joint Sector Review Assessment, 2014: Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive, Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue, 104p.
32. Triulzi, U., & P. Montalbano, P. (2001). Development Cooperation Policy: A Time Inconsistency Approach. Research Report 2/2001. Denmark: Federico Caffé Center, Roskilde University.
33. Uganda, Joint Sector Review Assessment, 2014: Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive, Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue, 91p.

## VIII. ANNEXES

## Annex 1: List of People Interviewed during the Joint Sector Review Mission

N°	Names	Gender	Institutions	e-mail	Country	REC
1.	Martha Makenge	F	East African Civil Society Organizations Forum (EACSOFF)	eacsoff@gmail.com	Tanzania	EAC
2.	Dr. Enock Warinda	M	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA)	e.warinda@asareca.org	Kenya	EAC
3.	Joe Mzinga	M	Eastern and Southern Africa Farmers Forum (ESAFF)	coordinator@esaff.org	Zimbabwe	EAC
4.	Dr. Florence Nakayiwa Mayega	F	Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture (RUFORUM)	f.nakayiwa@ruforum.org	Uganda	EAC
5.	Dr. Robert Kayanda	M	Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO)	rkayanda@lvfo.org		EAC
6.	Stephen Muchiri	M	Eastern African Farmers Federation (EAFF)			EAC
7.	Dorothy Mukhebi	F	African Women in Agricultural Research and Development (AWARD)	d.mukhebi@cgiar.org		EAC
8.	Stella Massawe	F	AGRA	smassawe@agra.org	Kenya	EAC
9.	Joseph Karugia	M	ReSAKKS, East and central Africa	J.Karugia@cgiar.org	Tanzania	EAC
10.	ONDOA MANGA Tobie	M	CAADP Country Focal Point	ondoamt@yahoo.fr	Cameroon	ECCAS
11.	André LACHAPPELLE	M	Technical Adviser	a_lachap@hotmail.com	Cameroon	ECCAS
12.	NTOUDA Lucien	M	Member of the TS/RSDS	larryntouda@gmail.com	Cameroon	ECCAS
13.	SIAMA SIAMA Etienne	M	Member of the TS/RSDS	etienne.siama@yahoo.fr	Cameroon	ECCAS

14.	Mme ATANGANA	F	CNOPCAM	elisabeth.atangana1@gmail.com	Cameroon	ECCAS
15.	Bakari BOBBO	M	PLANOPAC	babaray1963@yahoo.fr	Cameroon	ECCAS
16.	MRAVILI Athman	M	FAO rep	Athman.Mravili@fao.org	Cameroon	ECCAS
17.	Mme ANDELA Christine	F	COSADER	andelac@yahoo.com	Cameroon	ECCAS
18.	Albert FARRAS	M	Consultant EGIS	farats@wanadoo.fr	France	France
19.	Gwendoline Na-ah Nyambi	F	Member of the TS/RSDS	gnyambi@yahoo.com	Cameroon	ECCAS
20.	TRAORE Adama	M	APESS	tradamas@gmail.com	Burkina-Faso	ECOWAS
21.	Ousseini OUEDAROGO	M	ROPPIA	coouedraogo@yahoo.fr	Burkina-Faso	ECOWAS
22.	Aliou Ibrahima	M	SE APESS	ibrahimaaliou.apess@gmail.com	Burkina-Faso	ECOWAS
23.	Sibiri Jean ZOUNDI	M	Administrateur principal Secrétariat club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'ouest (SCSAO/ OCDE)	sibirijean.zoundi@oecd.org	France	ECOWAS
24.	Boureima Dodo	M	R.B.M	gouroubanda@yahoo.fr	Niger	ECOWAS
25.	YADE Mbaye	M	IITA- RESAKSS-WA	M.yadecgiar.org	Nigeria	ECOWAS
26.	TRARO Sy Alain	M	Directeur Ag	satrao@ecowas.int	Nigeria	ECOWAS
27.	FATMATA Seiwoh	F	M&E	fatmata.seiwoh@yahoo.com	Nigeria	ECOWAS
28.	Anselme Vodounhessi	M	FARA M&E	avodounhessi@faraafrica.org	Ghana	ECOWAS
29.	Charles Ebojei	M	Agriculture research council of Nigeria	coebojei@gmail.com	Nigeria	ECOWAS
30.	Nwafor, Manson	M	Policy Analyst   ReSAKSS WA	M.Nwafor@cgiar.org	Nigeria	ECOWAS
31.	Yamar MBODJ	M	Directeur Exécutif Hub Rural	yamarm@hubrural.org	Sénégal	ECOWAS
32.	KHADY Fall Tall	F	AFAO-WAMA	afaowawa@afaowama.com	Sénégal	ECOWAS
33.	Abdou Tenkouano	M	Directeur Exécutif CORAF	a.tenkouano@coraf.org	Sénégal	ECOWAS
34.	Dr Abdulai Jalloh	M	Director of Research and innovation of CORAF	abdulai.jalloh@coraf.org	Sénégal	ECOWAS





## Contact Information

---



230 15th Road, Randjespark  
Midrand, 1685



+ 27(0) 11 256 3600



[info@nepad.org](mailto:info@nepad.org)



**AUDA-NEPAD**  
AFRICAN UNION DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

**CAADP**